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PREFACE 
Until recently, Security and QoS were considered as separate entities, especially 
in a mobile ad hoc network environment. Most widely used security mechanisms create 
heavy overhead and delay to communications. Research in wireless networks indicate 
more security will create more overhead, which willimpact overall network QoS.  
This dissertation suggests policy based plug-in security framework to provide 
more flexible security support, and a multi-layer QoS guided routing algorithm to provide 
better QoS performance, specifically for ad hoc network environments. In addition, we 
propose an on-demand security and QoS optimization algorithm which can balance 
security and QoS to optimize network performance.  
By using the proportional integral derivative (PID) feedback control, the proposed 
optimization algorithm constantly monitors the ad hoc network resource status, if there 
are enough resources available to handle current QoS requirements, it will implement 
more security policies dynamically to make the network less vulnerable. This results in 
significant increase of network resource utilization, better QoS performance and more 
secure ad hoc networks. 
How can we determine that a new routing protocol is more secure than any 
existing protocol? In this dissertation, we propose an attack tree and state machine based 
security evaluation mechanism for ad hoc networks. This is a new security measurement 
 iv 




I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Johns n Thomas for his guidance 
and assistance at Oklahoma State University. I would also like to thank my committee 
members, Dr. G.E. Hedrick, Dr. Venkatesh Saragan, Dr. Debao Chen, Dr. Martin 
Crossland and Dr. Mark Weiser, for their helpful contributions and advice. 
Heart-felt thanks goes to my wife and my parents for their unending 
encouragement and emotional support throughout the years. 
Finally I would like to thank all my friends who stood beside me with their 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
     Page 
Chapter 1  Introduction      
 
1.1 Background..........…………………………………………….….…….…..…..1 
1.2 Security…............… ………………………………………….….…….…..…..3 
1.3 QoS………..........……………………………………………….….…….…..…...4 
1.4 Security and QoS Optimization……………………………….….…….…..….5 
1.5 Security Measurement……………………………….….…….…..…………....6 
 
 





2.4 Security and QoS Optimization……………….…………….….…….…..…...15 
2.5 Security Measurement………………………….….…….….…..….................18 
 
 
Chapter 3  Objectives and Assumptions 
 
3.1 Dissertation Objectives...........................…………………...…………..……22 
3.2 Design Assumptions................................……………………………...………...23 
3.2 Simulation Tool................................………………………...........………..........24 
 
 





4.4 Domain Join..........…………………………………………….….…….……..29 
4.5 Resource Accessing……………………………………….….……….…..…..31 
4.6 Domain Leaving..……………… ……………………….….…….…..………..33 
4.7 Policy Management Architecture………………………….….…….………..….34 
4.8 Label Based Security Policy Algorithm.………………….…….………..…..37 
 
 4.8.1 Label Component Definitions and Valid Characters…………………….38 
 vii  
4.8.2 How Resource Label and User Label Work Together…………………...39 
4.8.3 Access Mediation……………………………………………………...42 
 4.8.4 How Labels Are Evaluated for Access Mediation……………………….42 
 
  4.8.4.1 Example of Read/Write Authorizations on Groups ......................43 
  4.8.4.2 Label Security Algorithm for Read Access…… ……...………44 
  4.8.4.3 Label Security Algorithm for Write Access……………...……...46 
 
4.9 Policy Management Language…………………………….….………….…..…..49 
4.10 Performance Analysis..…………………………………….….……….…..….53 
 
 4.10.1 Simulation Model………………………………… …………………...53 
4.10.2 Simulation Assumptions…………………………………………….54 
4.10.3  Traffic and Mobility models…………………………………...……...54 
4.10.4  Metrics…………………………………………………………………55 
4.10.5  Simulation Results…………………………………………………..56 
4.10.5  Conclusion……………………………………………………… ...…..58 
 
 
Chapter 5  Multi-Layer QoS Interface Guided Routing 
 
5.1 Introduction………..............……………………………….………… …….…59 
5.2 Multi-Layer QoS Interface Guided Routing……………….……………….…61 
5.3 Path Generation..………………………………………………………………65 
5.4 Path Selection..........……………………………………….….…….……..…..69 
5.5 QoS Interface.......………………………………………….….….………..….72 
5.6 Performance Analysis…………………………………….….…….……..…...74 
 
 5.6.1 Simulation Model………………………………………………… ……..74 
5.6.2 Traffic and Mobility models……………………………………… ...…..75 




Chapter 6  Security and QoS Optimization 
 
6.1 Introduction..................................………………………...………………..…….82 
6.2 Feedback Control Theory……………………………….….……………..…..85 
 
6.2.1 Proportional Control………………………………………… ...……...87 
6.2.2  Proportional-Integral Control………………………………………….88 
6.2.3  Proportional-Integral-Derivative Control……………………...……...89 
 
6.3 Security and QoS Feedback Control Loop……………….….………....…..……91 
6.4 Measure Network Resource Availability………………….….….…….....…...93 
6.5 Security Plug-in Architecture..…………………………….….……....…..…..95 
 viii  
6.6 Optimization Algorithm..……………………………………..…….…….…..….97 
 
 6.6.1 Greedy Algorithm……………………………………… ..……………97 
 
6.7 Policy Depolyment Post Validation……………………….….…...….…..….101 
6.8 Performance Analysis…………………………………….….…………..…..104 
 
6.7.1  Simulation Model…………………………………………… ……….104 
6.7.2  Traffic and Mobility models……………………………… ...……….105 
6.7.3  Security Policies……………………………………………………...106 
6.7.4  Simulation Results……………………………………………...……107 
6.7.5  Conclusion………………………………………………...……………110 
 
 
Chapter 7  Network Security Measurement 
 
7.1 Introduction..................................…………………………......…………..……111 
7.2 Fundamentals of Security and Attack.………………………......…………..….113 
 
7.2.1  Security and Dependability……………………………..………..….113 
7.2.2  Faults and Errors……………………………………………..……...115 
7.2.3  Threats…………………………………… …………………..……...116 
7.2.4  Security Principals and Policies………………………..……………....117 
 
7.3 Attack Surface…………................………………………...……..………..…..120 
7.4 Proposed Measurement Technique……………………...…………....……..122 
 
7.4.1 Vulnerability Assessment and Security Measurement..…........…..…..122 
7.4.2 State Machine........……………………...…………..……..………..123 
7.4.3 Model Threat Agents………………………………………………...125 
7.4.4 Model Attack Tree………………………………… ………………...128 
 
7.5 Security Measurement Metric......………………………...………………..…...131 
 
7.5.1  Dimensions of a Threat Agent………………………………………….131 
7.5.2  Attack Goal and Attack Path………………………………………...132 
7.5.3  Critical Path……………….……………………………………………132 
7.5.4  Access Rights………………………………………………………...133 
7.5.5  Examples………………………………… ……………………..........134 
 
7.6 Security Measurement......…………………………...…………..…………..137 
7.7 Example of Security Measurement Metric......…… ……...…………..…...144 




Chapter 8  Conclusions and Future Works 
 
8.1  Overall conclusion...…………………………………………………………147 
8.2  Policy based security…………………………………………………………149 
 
 8.2.1 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...149 
 8.2.2 Future Work..………………………………… ……………………...149 
 
8.3  Multi-layer QoS interface guided routing………………………………………150 
 
 8.3.1 Conclusion……………………………… …………………………...150 
 8.3.2 Future Work..…… …………………………………………………...150 
 
8.4  Security and QoS optimization………………………………………………151 
 
 8.4.1 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...151 
 8.4.2 Future Work..………………………………… ……………………...151 
 
8.5  Security Measurement……………………………………………………….153 
  
8.5.1 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...153 












LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure                                                                                           Page 
 
4.1   Network Policy Domain.………………….………….………...……………...27 
4.2   Domain Joining Process………………………………………………………….30 
4.3   Resource Accessing Validation Process………………………………………32 
4.4   Domain Leaving Process…………………………………………...………………33 
4.5   Policy Management Architecture….. .………….…..…….……...…..…………..34 
4.6   Network Layer Structure with Security Policy Management…..…......….…….…..36 
4.7   Resource Categorizations with Levels, Compartmen s, and Groups ..….…….…39 
4.8   Example: Resource Labels and user Labels ……..….……..……...….…….…40 
4.9   How Label Components Interrelate……………………... …...……..…….……..41 
4.10 Relationships between Users, Resource, and Labels .……....…………….………..42 
4.11 Subgroup Inheritance of Read/Write Access…………. ...……………….…..….44 
4.12 Label Evaluation Process for Read Access..…….….……..………..….……..45 
4.13 Label Evaluation Process for Write Access....…... …….……...…………………47 
4.14 A sample policy in XACML format… ………………….…..…………………..52 
4.15 Packet Delivery Ratios.....………………………….…………….. ……..............56 
4.16 Routing Performance……………………………………………..…..……….…...57 
5.1   Network Layer Structure and QoS Metrics Mapping……………..…..………...…62 
5.2   Throughput for v = 5 m/s..……….….............................................................77 
5.3   Average packets delay for v = 5 m/s....………… ……...……………………...77 
5.4   Throughput for v = 10 m/s..…..........…………………………..…………………..97 
 xi 
5.5   Average packet delay for v = 10 m/s..………........................................................80 
6.1   Feedback Control System......…………………….…………….. ….…………...85 
6.2   Derivative Controller......…………………….………....……..………………...88 
6.3   Integral Controller.………………….………….………...…………..……............89 
6.4   PID Controller …..….………….…..…….………..………… …..……………..90 
6.5   QoS and Security PID Feedback Control Loop…………..….....….…….…..92 
6.6   Network Security Policy Plug-in Architecture ..….…….…..…………………….95 
6.7   Greedy Algorithm ……..……….……..…...….…….…..……………………….98 
6.8   Acceptable Utilization and Target Utilization ……………..…...……..……….…..99 
6.9   Need More Policy………………………………… .…….…..………….………100 
6.10 Policy Deployment Post Validation Process Flow ….….……..………….…..…102 
6.11 Policy Deployment Post Validation Algorithm.……….………………..….……..103 
6.12 Throughput for v = 10 m/s....…...……….…………………….. ……………...107 
6.13 Average packets delay for v = 10 m/s ……………………….…..………………108 
6.14 Security policies are used for v = 10 m/s………….…………..…………............109 
7.1   Fault Path……………………………… ………….………………………...........116 
7.2   Network security measurement metric.………….………… ………..............123 
7.3   Aspects of a threat agent………………. ……….………………………...........127 
7.4   Attack tree…………………………… ………….………………………..............129 
7.5   Critical path of attack tree…………… ……….………………………..............133 
7.6   Security metric of AODV under sniffing attack…………………..........................140 
7.7   Measure security among different networks.…….…………………..............142 
7.8   Measure security among different threats.……….…………………..............143 
 xii  
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                            Page 
4.1   Three Dimensions of Label Security Policy ……….…………...……………….....37 
4.2   Sensitivity Label Components …..….………….…..……….………..…………….38 
5.1   QoS metrics mapping table ……………….. ……...……………………………..69 
5.2   Interfaces mapping table ….…............................................................................72 
6.1   Proportional, integral and derivative controller.…………………….………….......86 
6.2   QoS metric parameter mapping …….………....…… …………………...............93 
6.3   Security policy priority ………….………….………......……………..............106 
7.1   Dependability Property of a System …….………...…… …………...................114 
7.2   Security Property of a System ……….………...………………….........................114 
7.3   AODV under sniffing attack…….………...………………................................135 
7.4   AODV under message alternation attack ………………....................................136 
7.5   10 most common attacks in ad hoc network ………….......................................144 
7.6   Attack measurement of AODV and DSDV………….......................................144 
 
 xiii  
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
ABR  - Associatively Based Routing. 
AODV  - Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing. 
BER  - Bit Error Rate. 
BSAR  - Bootstrapping and Routing. 
CGSR  - Clusterhead-Gateway Switch Routing. 
CPU  - Central Process Unit. 
CSER  - Cooperative Security-Enforcement Routing. 
CSMA/CD - Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection. 
CTS  - Clear To Send. 
DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 
DCF  - Distributed Coordination Function. 
DSDV  - Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing. 
EWMA - Exponentially Weighted Moving Average. 
FIFO  - First In First Out. 
LAN  - Local Area Network. 
LAR  - Location-Aided Routing. 
MAC  - Medium Access Control. 
MANET - Mobile Ad Hoc Network. 
PDA  - Personal digital assistants. 
 xiv 
PID  - Proportional, Integral and Derivative. 
QoS  - Quality of Service. 
OSI  - Open System Interconnection. 
OTCL  - Object-oriented Tool Control Language. 
RTS  - Request To Send. 
SAAR  - Security Aware Ad Hoc Routing. 
SAODV - Secure Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing. 
SBRP  - Secure Bootstrapping and Routing. 
SEAD  - Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing. 
SINR  - Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio. 
SRP  - Secure Routing Protocol. 
SSR  - Signal Stability Routing. 
TORA  - Temporary Ordered Routing Algorithm. 
WLAN - Wireless Local Area Network. 
WRP  - Wireless Routing Protocol. 










Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) consist of wireless hosts that communicate 
with each other in the absence of a fixed infrastructure [1]. They have potential 
applications in disaster relief, conference, and battlefield environments, and have 
received significant attention in recent years. 
In a MANET, a message sent by a node reaches all its ne ghboring nodes that are 
located at distances up to the transmission radius. Because of the limited transmission 
radius, the routes between nodes are normally created through several hops in such multi-
hop wireless networks [1]. Host mobility can cause frequent unpredictable topology 
changes [2]. 
In order to facilitate communication within the network, a routing protocol is used 
to discover routes between nodes. The primary goal of such an ad hoc network routing 
protocol is correct and efficient route establishment between a pair of nodes so that 
messages may be delivered in a timely manner [2]. Route construction should be done 
with a minimum of overhead and bandwidth consumption.  
 2 
Many protocols have been proposed for MANETs, with the goal of achieving 
efficient routing [1]. The MANET routing methods can be categorized as two primary 
classes: table-driven and demand-driven.  
Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain consistent, up-to-date routing 
information from each node to every other node in the network. These protocols include: 
DSDV, CGSR, WRP [1][3]. The major disadvantages of table-driven routing protocols 
are each node needs to send messages to its neighborhoods consistently to keep their 
routing tables update. This can cause network traffic overhead. 
Demand-driven (Source-Initiated) routing protocols create routes only when 
desired by the source node. When a node requires a oute to a destination, it initiates a 
route discovery process within the network. This process is completed once a route is 
found or all possible route permutations have been examined. The demand-driven routing 
protocols include: AODV, DSR, TORA, ABR, SSR [1][4][5]. The demand-driven 
routing protocols do not need maintain routing tables, but have the overhead of route 
discovery. 
The simulation results reported in several papers [1] [2] [4] show that normally 
demand-driven routing protocols have higher packet delivery ratio and need less routing 
messages than table-driven routing protocols. 
In this dissertation, we will discuss four aspects of MANETS: security, QoS, 
security and QoS optimization, and security measurement. 
 3 
1.2 Security 
Research on securing ad hoc networks has concentrated on secure routing, 
intrusion detection and key management. Although these techniques will deliver the 
message securely to the destination or authenticate nod s, all sources have the same 
access rights to resources at the destination. Given th  increasing sophistication of 
computers, cell phones, PDAs etc., that form ad hocnetworks, as well as the 
increasing complexity of the services such networks provide, there is a need for an 
additional level of security for resource protection. In this dissertation we propose a 
distributed policy based architecture for mobile ad hoc networks, the 
implementation of the policy is also presented.  Simulations indicate that the routing 
overheads associated with the proposed system make this a feasible approach for 
enhancing the security of mobile ad hoc networks.  
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1.3 QoS 
Quality-of-service (QoS) routing in an Ad Hoc network is difficult because 
network topology may change constantly, and the available state information for routing 
is inherently imprecise. Existing QoS routing approaches concentrate on QoS 
management at the network layer. In this dissertation, we propose a holistic multi-layer 
QoS surface guided routing, which separates metrics at the different layers, MAC layer 
metrics, network layer metrics, and application layer metrics. In our model, each layer 
manages its own QoS and communicates with other lays through its QoS surface. Due 
to link failure caused by a lack of network resources and nodes’ mobility on a path, the 
quality should not only reflect the available resources on a path but also the stability of 
that path. Therefore, MAC layer metrics, network layer metrics and application layer 
metrics are used as additional constraints to determin  the quality of paths between a 
source and destination. Network layer metrics determine the quality of links in order to 
generate the paths with good quality. On the other hand, application layer metrics select 
exactly one path out of the paths with a good quality which is more likely to meet 
application requirements. Our model considers not oly the QoS requirement, but also the 
cost optimality of the routing path to improve the overall network performance. 
Simulation results show that the proposed approach provides better QoS than other QoS 
routing protocols such as QoS-AODV under high mobility conditions. 
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1.4 Security and QoS Optimization 
Network quality-of-service and network security have been considered as 
separate entities and research in these areas have largely proceeded independently. 
However, security impacts overall QoS and it is therefore essential to consider both 
security and QoS together when designing protocols for ad hoc environments as one 
impact the other. In this dissertation we propose a mechanism for a distributed 
dynamic management system which will aim to maximize QoS and/or security while 
maintaining a minimum user acceptable level of QoS and/or security even as network 
resource availability change. In order to achieve this objective, we propose three basic 
frameworks: a policy based plug-in security framework, multi-layer QoS guided 
routing and a proportional integral derivative (PID) controller. Figure 1-1 
demonstrates the overall optimization system flow. Simulation results indicate the 
proposed PID optimized security and QoS algorithm produce similar performance as 
non-secure QoS routing protocols under various traffic loads. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 QoS and Security Optimization System 
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1.5 Security Measurement 
Although, numerous secure and insecure ad hoc routing protocols have been 
proposed, it is a very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these protocols from a 
security perspective due to the absence of absolute security metrics for ad hoc networks. 
Not much research as been done in this area, because it is very difficult, if not impossible 
to define absolute security metrics for ad hoc networks. 
We propose a metric to determine whether one routing protocol of an Ad Hoc 
network is relatively more secure than another. Rather han count bugs at the protocol 
code level or count vulnerability reports at the network level, we count the network’s 
attack opportunities. We use this count as an indication of the network’s security risk, 
likelihood that it will be successfully attacked. We describe a network’s measurement 
metric along four abstract dimensions: attack goal, attack path, attack tree, and access 
rights. Intuitively, the more exposed the security isk, the more likely the network could 
be successfully attacked, and hence the more insecure it is. Thus, one way to improve 
network security is to reduce its security risk. We demonstrate and validate our method 
by measuring the relative security risk of different routing protocols. 
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Chapter 2    
 
Review of the Literature 
2.1 Overview 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) consist of wireless hosts that communicate 
with each other in the absence of a fixed infrastructure [1]. They have potential 
applications in disaster relief, conference, and battlefield environments, and have 
received significant attention in recent years. 
In a MANET, a message sent by a node reaches all its ne ghboring nodes that are 
located at distances up to the transmission radius. Because of the limited transmission 
radius, the routes between nodes are normally created through several hops in such multi-
hop wireless networks [1]. Host mobility can cause frequent unpredictable topology 
changes [2]. 
In order to facilitate communication within the network, a routing protocol is used 
to discover routes between nodes. The primary goal of such an ad hoc network routing 
protocol is correct and efficient route establishment between a pair of node so that 
messages may be delivered in a timely manner [2]. Route construction should be done 
with a minimum of overhead and bandwidth consumption.  
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Many protocols have been proposed for MANETs, with the goal of achieving 
efficient routing [1]. The MANET routing methods can be categorized as two primary 
classes: table-driven and demand-driven.  
Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain consistent, up-to-date routing 
information from each node to every other node in the network. These protocols include: 
DSDV, CGSR, WRP [1][3]. The major disadvantages of table-driven routing protocols 
are each node needs to send messages to its neighborhoods consistently to keep their 
routing tables update. This can cause network traffic overhead. 
Demand-driven (Source-Initiated) routing protocols create routes only when 
desired by the source node. When a node requires a oute to a destination, it initiates a 
route discovery process within the network. This process is completed once a route is 
found or all possible route permutations have been examined. The demand-driven routing 
protocols include: AODV, DSR, TORA, ABR, SSR [1][4][5]. The demand-driven 
routing protocols do not need maintain routing tables, but have the overhead of route 
discovery.  
The simulation results reported in several papers [1] [2] [4] show that normally 
demand-driven routing protocols have higher packet delivery ratio and need less routing 
messages than table-driven routing protocols. 
However, all the previous routing solutions only deal with the best-effort data 
traffic. Connections with QoS requirements, such as video broadcasting with delay and 
bandwidth constraints, are not supported. 
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2.2 Security 
Mobile ad-hoc networks operate in the absence of fixed infrastructure, which 
makes them easy to deploy at any place and at any time. The absence of any fixed 
infrastructure in mobile ad-hoc networks makes it difficult to utilize the existing 
techniques for network services, and this poses a number of various challenges including 
routing, bandwidth constraints, security and power. The diversity of nodes range from 
powerful lap top computers to resource constrained d vices such as PDAs and cell 
phones.  Such diversity makes it more difficult to manage and secure these networks.   
Various routing solutions have been proposed for mobile ad-hoc networks, and 
most of these solutions can be categorized as table-driv n and demand-driven. These 
solutions mainly focus on routing and do not concentrate much on other related issues, 
such as security.  
Depending on the application, users within the network may want their 
communication to be secure. Research on securing ad hoc networks has concentrated on 
secure routing, intrusion detection and key management. With the increasing proliferation 
of powerful nodes which can now form part of an ad hoc network, existing mechanisms 
are not sufficient. In the current state of the art ad hoc network systems security, all nodes 
in the network have equal security rights. In other words, although secure routing will 
deliver the message securely to the destination, all sources have the same access rights to 
resources at the destination. With existing approaches, although a message may be 
delivered securely, the message itself may be trying to access or modify resources for 
malicious purposes. The absence of any strict security policy, could lead active attackers 
to easily exploit or possibly disable the mobile ad-hoc network. The consequences of this 
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are serious as the more powerful nodes can be attacked by smaller resource constrained 
nodes and the disabling of one or more powerful nodes could have a serious impact on 
the network. Although secure routing with intrusion detection can guarantee a certain 
level of security, higher level security is needed to secure the network. Furthermore, 
secure routing and real-time intrusion detection carry extensive overheads. 
Several secure routing protocols have been proposed recently: These include 
SAODV [6], Ariadne [7], SEAD [8], CSER [9], SRP [10], SAAR [11], BSAR [12], and 
SBRP [13]. The main idea behind these protocols is to encrypt the messages using 
different schemes so that the message delivered correctly.  Depending upon the scheme 
used, these secure routing protocols bind one or tw security methods into the specific 
routing protocol.   
The policy-based security management system [14] uses responsive strategy to 
react when network under attack. Each node has an att ck monitoring agent, and when a 
victim node is under attack, it activates correspondent policies. It also sends a warning 
message to neighboring nodes. When it recovers from an attack, it sends a warning 
release message. To the best of our knowledge, a policy management framework has not 




The provision of QoS relies on resource reservation. Hence, the data packets of 
QoS connection are likely to flow along the same network path on which the required 
resources are reserved. The goal of QoS routing is twofold: 1) selecting a network path 
that has sufficient resources to meet the QoS requir ments of all admitted connections 
and 2) achieving global efficiency in resource utilization. 
QoS routing has been receiving increasingly intensive attention in the wired 
network domain [15]. The recent work can be divided into three broad categories: source 
routing, distributed routing, and hierarchical routing. In source routing [16] – [18], each 
node maintains an image of the global network state, which is based on a routing path 
that is centrally computed at the source node. The global network state is typically 
updated periodically by a link-state algorithm [19]. In distributed routing [20] – [23], the 
path is computed by a distributed computation during which control messages are 
exchanged among the nodes, and the state information kept at each node is collectively 
used in order to find a path. In hierarchical routing [24], nodes are clustered into groups, 
creating a multilevel hierarchy. In every level of the hierarchy, source or distributed 
routing algorithms are used. 
The QoS routing algorithms for wired networks cannot be applied directly to Ad 
Hoc networks. First, the performance of most wired outing algorithms relies on the 
availability of precise state information. However, the dynamic nature of an Ad Hoc 
network makes the available state information inherently imprecise. Second, nodes may 
join, leave, and rejoin an Ad Hoc network at any time and any location; existing links 
may disappear, and new links may be formed as the nod s move. Hence, the established 
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paths can be broken at any time, which raises new problems of maintaining and 
dynamically reestablishing the routing paths in the course of data transmission. 
Though some recent algorithms [18][25] were proposed to work with imprecise 
information (e.g., the probability distribution of link delay), they require precise 
information about the network topology, which is not available in an Ad Hoc network. 
QoS based routing in networks with inaccurate information [18] investigated the 
problem of routing connections with QoS requirements across one or more networks, 
when the information available for making routing decisions is inaccurate and expressed 
in some probabilistic manner. It reviewed the uncertainty about the actual state of a node 
or network that arises naturally in a number of diferent environments, and proposed an 
algorithm to determine the impact of such inaccuracies on the path selection process, 
whose goal is then to identify the path that is most likely to satisfy the QoS requirements. 
QoS routing in networks with uncertain parameters [25] discussed the multicast 
routing problem with multiple QoS constraints in networks with uncertain parameters. It 
proposed an algorithm QMRGA, a multicast routing policy for Internet, mobile network 
or other high-performance networks, which is based on the genetic algorithm, and can 
provide QoS-sensitive paths in a scalable and flexib  way, in a network environment 
with uncertain parameters. The QMRGA can also optimize network resources such as 
bandwidth and delay, and can converge to the optimal or near-optimal solution within 
little iteration, even for a network environment with uncertain parameters. The 
incremental rate of computational cost is close to polynomial and is less than exponential 
rate. The results show that QMRGA provides a reasonble approach to QoS Multicast 
routing in networks environment with uncertain parameters. 
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Recently, cross-layer design approach [26] - [29] has been introduced into ad hoc 
wireless network to resolve the above issues.  
A Simulator Based on a Cross-Layer Protocol between MAC and PHY Layers in 
WiBro Compatible IEEE 802.16e OFDMA System [28] proosed a cross-layer design 
frameworks for 802.16e OFDMA systems that are compatible with WiBro based on 
various kinds of cross-layer protocols for performance improvement: a cross-layer 
adaptation framework and a design example of primitives for cross-layer operation 
between its MAC and PHY layers. It provided a simulation framework for cross-layer 
analysis between the MAC and PHY layers in 802.16e systems, which shows that 
average cell throughput can be improved by 25-60 percent by applying careful cross-
layer adaptation schemes. 
Topology-Aided Cross-Layer Fast Handoff Designs for IEEE 802.11/Mobile IP 
Environments [29] reviewed state-of-the-art fast handoff techniques for IEEE 802.11 or 
Mobile IP networks. Based on that review, topology-aided cross-layer fast handoff 
designs are proposed for Mobile IP over IEEE 802.1.1 networks. Time-sensitive 
applications, such as voice over IP (VoIP), cannot tolerate the long layer-2 plus layer-3 
handoff delays that arise in IEEE 802.11/Mobile IP environments. Cross-layer designs 
are increasingly adopted to shorten the handoff latency time. Handoff-related layer-2 
triggers may reduce the delay between layer-2 handoff completion and the associated 
layer-3 handoff activation. Cross-layer topology information, such as the association 
between 802.11 access points and Mobile IP mobility agents, together with layer-2 
triggers, can be utilized by a mobile node to start layer-3 handoff-related activities, such 
as agent discovery, address configuration, and regist ation, in parallel with or prior to 
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those of layer-2 handoff. Experimental results indicate that the whole handoff delay can 
meet the delay requirement of VoIP applications when layer-3 handoff activities occur 
prior to layer-2 handoffs. 
The cross-layer protocols are designed by violating the seven-layer open systems 
interconnect (OSI) model to provide overall better efficiency and performance in ad hoc 
wireless environment. Here the functionality of multiple layers is condensed into fewer 
layers with the view to improving performance. The cross-layer designs involve a 




2.4 Security and QoS Optimization 
Network quality-of-service and network security have been considered as separate 
entities and research in these areas have largely proceeded independently with few 
exceptions. However, security impacts overall network QoS as more security usually 
means more message overheads for authentication and other security functions as well as 
additional delays imposed due to overheads caused by encryption etc. This is especially 
true in an ad hoc network environment where security mechanisms such as authentication 
services are proposed to protect the communication on open mediums in wireless 
networks, thus introducing overheads that affect the QoS of communications 
significantly. It is therefore essential to consider both security and QoS together when 
designing protocols for ad hoc environments as one impacts the other.  
Very little work has been done in the interaction between security and QoS in 
networks. What little has been done is limited to wireless networks. [30] - [33] study the 
impact of challenge/response authentication in wireless LANs.  
An Analytical Study on the Impact of Authentication Local Area Networks [30] 
introduced a system model for the analysis of challenge/response authentication in 
wireless networks, and evaluated authentication cost, delay, and call dropping probability 
for different security levels. By considering traffic and mobility patterns, the numerical 
results indicate the impact of authentication on security and system performance. 
A Quantitative Study of Authentication Networks [31] and Performance Analysis 
of Challenge/Authentication in Wireless Networks [32] analyzed the impact of 
authentication on security and QoS quantitatively, and proposed a concept of security 
level to describe the protection of communications according to the nature of security, 
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i.e., information secrecy, data integrity, and resource availability. By taking traffic and 
mobility patterns into account, the proposed approach establishes a direct and quantitative 
connection between security and QoS through the authentication. Numerical results are 
provided to demonstrate the impact of security levels, mobility and traffic patterns on 
overall system performance in terms of authentication delay and call dropping 
probability. 
Integration of Authentication Management in Third Generation and WLAN Data 
Networks [33] introduced new authentication architecture for fast authentication during 
inter-networking handoff and large-scale heterogeneous networks to solve authentication 
of roaming users crossing different networks problem in WLAN. The simulation results 
show that the new architecture can reduce authentication latency significantly and be 
adaptive to user mobility and traffic. 
In summary, the emphasis of [30] is on a framework t  model the effect of 
authentication on security and QoS in one-hop wireless networks. In [31] and [32] the  
authors investigate the impact of security levels, mobility and traffic patterns on overall 
system performance in terms of authentication cost, delay, and call dropping probability. 
[33] introduces an authentication scheme for inter-domain roaming for 3G/WLAN 
systems. The emphasis here is on authentication architecture and a new authentication 
scheme. 
Although the above research provided an analysis of the performance degradation 
caused by authentication and proposed an authentication scheme for inter-domain 
roaming for 3G/WLAN systems, none of them propose an optimized solution between 
security and QoS.  In other words, given the network resources and traffic, can an 
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optimum QoS and security be achieved? This calls for a dynamic management system 
which will aim to maximize QoS and security while maintaining a minimum user 
acceptable level of QoS and security even as network resource availability change. In all 
the previous work the security feature (authentication specifically) is fixed and is 
permanent and is integrated with a QoS routing protocol. However, no solution has been 
provided when changing available network resources due to traffic, mobility etc. results 
in security features producing too much overhead such that it significantly impacts 
routing QoS performance. Furthermore, security is not limited to authentication. Other 
security features such as access rights for example hav  not been considered at all. 
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2.5 Security Measurement 
Current Ad Hoc protocols assume that the mobile host will behave properly and 
will not introduce malicious information into the system. However, considering the 
application environments of Ad Hoc networks (battlefields, disaster rescue, etc.); the 
routing topology is prone to attack coming from both external and internal. Research has 
been carried out to apply security methods in wired networks to mobile Ad Hoc 
environments. The mechanisms that have been examined include information encryption 
and user authentication. But these methods face the following difficulties: 
• The restriction on power consumption and the limited computational 
capability of mobile devices prevent the usage of cmplex encryption 
algorithms. 
• The constantly changing network topology increases the difficulty and 
overhead of authentication. The dynamic membership put challenges on the 
key distribution and management. 
• Most importantly, these methods can only guard against external attacks. But 
the attacks coming from compromised hosts have more sev re impacts on 
performance and network connectivity. 
 
The security and safety properties of Ad Hoc routing protocols are different from 
those in wired networks. Therefore, research is requi d on the vulnerabilities of the 
protocols, the attacks introduced by them, and their practical impacts on the network 
performance. 
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An attack tree and attack graph is a succinct representation of all paths through a 
system that end in state where an attacker has succe sfully achieved his goal [46]. It has 
been used for attack detection, defense and forensics in security analysis. The attach tree 
cannot only clearly define all the sub-goals along each attack path, but also the 
relationship between each attach paths,  in order for an attacker to successfully achieve 
his ultimate attack goal. 
It is very difficult, if not impossible to define security metrics for ad hoc 
networks.  The concept of Attack Surface model introduced in [47] proposes a metric to 
determine whether one version of a system is more secure than another. Rather than 
measure the absolute security of a system, the proposed technique measures the relative 
security: Given two versions, A and B, of a system, it measures whether version A is 
more secure than version B with respect to their attack surface. The proposed technique 
does not use the attack surface metric to determine wh ther a version of a system is 
absolutely good or bad, rather to determine whether on  version of a system is relatively 
better or worse than another. Intuitively, a system’s attack surface is the ways in which 
the system can be successfully attacked. The attack surface of a system can be defined in 
terms of the system’s resources. An attacker uses a y tem’s resources to attack a system; 
hence a system’s resources contribute to the system’s attack surface. Intuitively, the more 
resources available to the attacker, the more exposd the attack surface. The more 
exposed the attack surface, the more ways the system can be attacked, and hence the 
more insecure it is. Given two versions, A and B, of a system, the proposed technique 
compares their attack surface to determine whether on  is more secure than another. The 
attack surface measurements might be incomparable because of the way we define attack 
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surface along multiple dimensions, it can, however, use the attack surface measurements 
along with the knowledge of the usage scenario of the system to determine whether 
version A is more secure than version B. 
Measuring relative attack surface [48] proposed a technique to measure computer 
Operating System vulnerability and attack ability by using attack surface metric. Every 
system action can potentially be part of an attack, nd hence contributes to attack surface. 
Similarly, every system resource also contributes to at ack surface. Intuitively, the more 
actions available to a user or the more resources acessible through these actions, the 
more exposed the attack surface. Rather than consider all possible system resources, the 
proposed measurement technique narrows its focus on a relevant subset of resource types. 
Attacks carried out over the years show that certain system resources are more likely to 
be used in an attack than others. Hence all system resources should not be treated equally. 
The attack surface categorizes the system resources into attack classes based on a given 
set of properties associated with the resources. These properties reflect the attackability 
of a type of resource, i.e., some types of resources ar  more likely to be attacked than 
other types. The notion of attack class is used to istinguish between resources with 
different attackability. These attack classes together constitute the attack surface of a 
system. The proposed security measurement technique measured the attack surface of 
four different versions of the Linux operating system and the attack surface of seven 
different versions of the Windows operating system. The results of both the Linux and 
Windows measurements confirm perceived beliefs about the relative security of the 
different versions. It uses the entry point and exit po nt framework to identify the relevant 
subset of resources that contribute to the attackability of a system, then determines the 
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attackability of each resource using a cost-benefit rat o to the attacker. By grouping the 
resources into attack classes based on their attackbility, the attackability of these attack 
classes constitutes the attack surface of a system. 
In, summary, the attack surface model uses state machines to represent all 
potential system resources that can be used by an attacker to achieve an attack goal, and 
compare security with respect to a given number of yardsticks, called imensions. In this 
approach, rather than saying “System A is secure” or “System A has a measured security 
number N” the attack surface model says “System A is more secure than System B with 
respect to a fixed set of dimensions.” 
The attack surface model uses all system resources as one single level, equal 
weight metric. However, the hierarchies of the attack tree and the dependence between 
each attack paths have not been considered in this model. For example, system A 
exposures both user name and password should be morvulnerable than system B 
exposures both employee salary and password, although all of the above information are 
been classified as sensitive data. Because an attacker can create much more damages to 
system A than system B by using a stolen identity to successfully login into system A. 
The attack surface model measures same vulnerability level for both system A and 





Chapter 3     
 
Objectives and Assumptions 
3.1 Dissertation Objectives 
Our overall goal is to provide a security and QoS optimization architecture and 
algorithm that will have better resource utilization, ultimately provide more security and 
better QoS solution for ad hoc networks. In the dissertation, we: 
1. Propose a policy based plug-in security framework to adapt network 
security level on demand; 
2. Propose a multi-layer QoS guided routing algorithm to achieve more 
efficient and reliable QoS; 
3. Propose an on-demand security and QoS optimization architecture to 
provide better network resource utilization and optimize network 
performance, so to provide more secure and efficient QoS networks. 
4. Propose a new security measurement metric to compare the relative 
security of two Ad Hoc routing protocols that is a state machine based 
security evaluation mechanism. 
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3.2 Design Assumptions 
We make the following assumptions about the security and QoS optimization 
system: 
• Each node has same signal coverage area radius R. 
• Each node has adequate cache memory to hold the stae information, 
including routing data, security data, QoS data, and optimization data. 
• Each node has sufficient CPU power to handle requird computations, 
including security authentications, QoS calculations a d optimization 
calculations. 
• Nodes are randomly moving in a pre-defined two-dimension area. 
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3.3 Simulation Tool 
We use a detailed simulation model based on ns-2 in our evaluation. The Monarch 
research group at CMU developed support for simulation of multi-hop wireless networks 
complete with physical, data link and Medium Access Control (MAC) layer models on 
ns-2 [36]. The Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless 
LANs is used as the MAC layer protocol. The 802.11 DCF uses Request-To-Send (RTS) 
and Clear-To-Send (CTS) control packets for unicast d ta transmission to a neighboring 
node. The RTS/CTS exchange precedes the data packet transmission and implements a 
form of virtual carrier sensing and channel reservation to reduce the impact of the well-
know hidden terminal problem. Data packet transmission is followed by an ACK. 
Broadcast data packets and the RTS control packets ar  sent using physical carrier 
sensing. An unslotted CSMA technique with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) is used to 
transmit these packets. The radio model uses characteristics similar to a commercial radio 
interface, Lucent’s WaveLAN. WaveLAN is modeled as shared-mediaradio with a 
nominal bit rate of 2Mb/sec and normal radio range of 250 meters.  
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Chapter 4     
 
Policy Based Security 
4.1 Introduction 
Mobile ad-hoc networks are highly dynamic; topology changes and link 
breakages happen quite frequently. Therefore, we need a security solution which is 
dynamic. Any malicious or misbehaving nodes can generate hostile attacks. These types 
of attacks can seriously damage basic aspects of security, such as integrity, 
confidentiality and privacy of the node.  
In this chapter we propose a policy based architectur  for mobile ad hoc networks. 
Centralized policy based security has been implemented i  fixed infrastructure networks, 
but little (if any) research has focused on ad hoc networks. The policy architecture 
described here is distributed and dynamic as new policies can be added and removed as 
nodes enter and leave the network. This policy based security may not be applicable to all 
nodes in the network and may be implemented only on n des as needed. Interactions 
between devices need to be controlled in order to prevent unauthorized access to system 
resources and services. The framework also needs to be able to bind loosely with any 
existing or future routing protocols.  To the best of our knowledge no one has proposed a 
policy based secure architecture for mobile ad hoc networks.   
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Security policies are written definitions of expectations and principles for the 
protection of critical information from various threats and vulnerabilities. Security 
policies define how the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information are 
maintained. Policies typically mandate a risk assesment and data classification process 
for information and systems resources. Security policies also spell out responsibilities for 
maintaining security. They empower security personnel to control access, to monitor and 
maintain security, and to investigate and handle incidents. A policy based approach is 
flexible, scalable and permits adaptation to changes in security requirements and context 
of the ad hoc network by dynamically loading and removing policies from the system 
without interrupting its functioning. In this chapter, we propose a policy based security 
framework and a set of security rules to an ad hoc network, manage its membership, and 
control access to the services provided by the participants. We also show the proposed 
solution is robust to changes in the network topology. 
In sections 4.2 to 4.7 we describe the proposed policy based security system. The 
implementation of the policy is presented in sections 4.8 and 4.9. The routing overheads 




The term domain refers to a cluster of nodes in the Ad Hoc network with common 
attributes and properties, managed by a set of security policies, and those nodes 
communicate with each other. 
Definition: an ad hoc domain interconnects a group of devices, maintains 
membership and ensures that only entities, i.e., users or computing services which 
possess certain credentials, attribute information and characteristics can join the domain. 
The members of the domain rely upon each other to povide services and share resources. 
These interactions are regulated through a set of well-defined rules and policies that 
govern the access to the services and resources in the domain. 
 
 




Since the purpose of an ad hoc domain is to enable interactions between its 
members, it is thus important to ensure that these interactions are governed by well-
defined policies that define the rules for accessing ervices and resources in the domain. 
Policies are explicitly specified and known to all the members. 
The rationale of explicitly specifying the rules or security policies is to build trust 
between the members. Trust in this context derives from the fact that members’ behavior 
is expected to be consistent with both the characteristics dictated by the admission criteria 
and the policies governing the behavior within the domain. Typically, the members that 
form the domain have to rely on each other to provide the services that they do not have 
on their own and usually, they do not have any a priori knowledge about each other. As a 
result, collaborations among them cannot be set up because they do not trust each other to 
use their respective services and resources. Therefor , there is a need for explicit 
specification of policies for each domain. By knowing the policies, a node is aware of the 
potential nodes that it might trust to interact with, he services and resources that it has 
access to, and the policies it must enforce in order to protect its resources and services. 
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4.4 Domain Joining 
A new node N(new) periodically discovers a new domain in the neighborhood. It 
automatically requests to join the discovered domain. This is achieved by sending a 
{JOIN REQUEST} to one of the members of the domain; the receiver node contains the 
credentials of the requester node. 
Upon receipt of the join request, the receiver node ch cks N(new)’s credentials 
satisfy the domain policies and checks that the admittance of N(new) does not violate the 
cardinality constraints. Credential verification can be realized using standard existing 
approaches. A node id is then assigned to the admitted node and the receiver node sends 
{JOIN REPLY} to N(new). Subsequently, the membership list is updated and broadcast 
to all domain members. 
Sequence of events of domain joining: 
1. A node first has to get the credential from the centralized certificate authority; 
2. The centralized system admin sets up the public key that it obtains from the 
certificate authority on all the nodes in the domain, so that the newly arriving 
node’s credential can be authenticated; 
3. The newly arriving node sends a join request along with the credential issued by 
the certificate authority to any existing member in the domain; 
4. The domain member verifies the newly arriving node’s credential; 
5. The domain member replies to the join request an ACCEPTED or DENIED 
message to the newly arriving node; 
6. A new id will be assigned to the newly accepted node. 




Figure 4-2 Domain joining process 
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4.5 Resource Accessing 
Access to resources provided by domain members is regulated by domain 
policies. When a service provider receives a request, it first checks the membership list in 
order to determine the validity of the requestor’s node id assignment. Then, it grants the 
requestor the permissions to use the resource if thauthorization policies allow it. 
If a violation is detected, other domain members will be notified and if needed the 




Figure 4-3 Resource accessing validation process 
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4.6 Domain Leaving 
Two scenarios can occur: either the node notifies th  neighbors that it is going to 
leave the community or its unexpected absence is detected by others. If it is temporarily 
absent (e.g., node moves out of range) but its absence is not detected by other members, 
no changes are necessary. 
The first scenario is straightforward as the neighbors can remove the node from 
the membership list, which can then be broadcast to all members. In the second scenario, 
we rely on the other members detecting its absence, typically through a communication 
failure. When a communication failure occurs, a node will retry for up to x times. If the 
failure is confirmed, the node will remove the failure node from the membership list and 
broadcast the revised membership list.  
 
 
Figure 4-4 Domain leaving process 
 34 
4.7 Policy Management Architecture 
Figure 4-5 shows the overall architecture of the proposed framework. It is 
composed of four components: profile manager, membership manager, security rule 
manager, and policy manager. The framework runs on every node in the network. 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Policy management architecture 
 
Domain management interface is the interface channel to allow the 
communications between application layer and the domain security module. It’s the 
combination functions of the profile manager, membership manager and policy manager 
in Figure 4-5. 
The profile manager component maintains the node’s cr dentials, such as public-
key certificates, private-key stores and attribute certificates. Nodes can manage their 
credentials and device settings through the domain ma agement interface. In addition, 
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this component also maintains the node’s preference o  which domains the node should 
automatically join. 
The membership manager component exposes the domain management interface 
to the application level, so that applications can initiate the establishment of a new 
domain, search for domains, as well as joining particular domains. Through this interface, 
the node can register the services that it is providing to other participants. The 
membership manager component is also responsible for verifying the newly arriving 
nodes’ authenticity of the credentials and enforcing them by extracting and distributing 
the policy instances to the enforcement component, namely the security rule manager. 
The security rule manager component executes various security rules for 
establishment (enforce security policy execution on all existing nodes within the domain), 
evolution (enforce security policy execution on all newly joined nodes) and management 
(adapt the security policy execution based on different scenario) of domains. The security 
rule manager component enforces both the authorization and obligation policies. 
Authorization policies specify what activities a node is permitted or forbidden to do to a 
set of target resources, obligation policies specify what activities a node must or must not 
do to a set of target resources. Access requests are intercepted and then verified against 
the policies to determine if they are permitted, obligation policies are enforced by 
subscribing to the specified event and executing the actions specified in the policies when 
the events occur. They are both enforced by ‘label based policy algorithm’ that is 
discussed in section 4.8. 
The policy manager component contains all configured s curity policies. It 
provides an interface for security admin to manage the security polices. The policy 
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manager receives the policy request from security rule manager, responds back with the 
corresponding security policy based on the node’s membership information, which it gets 
from the membership manager. 
Figure 4-6 shows where the security policy management module fits in the 
network layer structure. It is transparent to the application layer, and independent of the 
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4.8 Label Based Security Policy Algorithm 
Label-based security polity provides a flexible way of controlling access to 
sensitive resources. Label security controls resource access based on the identity and 
label of the user, and the sensitivity or label of the resource. The label based security 
approach doesn’t require the entire security data to be stored in one place. Each resource 
carries its own security label information, and each resource might join or leave the ad 
hoc network at anytime. The authorization process will use access mediation with 
different parties to determine the actual access rights. Therefore, it is more suitable for 
the mobile ad hoc network scenario. With a label security policy, access to resource is 
controlled in three dimensions: 
Resource 
Labels 
Resources are labeled to indicate the level and nature of their sensitivity. A 
label on a resource specifies the sensitivity of the information and explicitly 
defines the criteria that must be met for a user to access it. 
User 
Labels 
Users are assigned a range of levels, compartments, and groups which 
indicate their label authorizations. A label assigned to a user determines the 
user's access to labeled resource. 
Policy 
Privileges 
Certain users may be given rights to perform special operations, and to 
access resource beyond their label authorizations. 
Table 4-1 Three Dimensions of Label Security Policy 
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• A label on a resource specifies the sensitivity of the information about the 
resource and explicitly defines the criteria that must be met for a user to access 
the resource. 
• Label authorizations assigned to a user determine the user's access to labeled 
resource. 
 
4.8.1  Label Component Definitions and Valid Characters 
A sensitivity label is a single attribute, with multip e components. All resource 
labels must contain a level component; compartment and group components are optional. 
The administrator must define the label components before create labels. 
Component Description Examples 
Level A single specification of the labeled 
resource's ordered sensitivity ranking 
CONFIDENTIAL (1),  
SENSITIVE (2),  
HIGHLY SENSITIVE (3) 
Compartments Zero or more categories associated with 




Groups Zero or more identifiers of 




Table 4-2 Sensitivity Label Components 
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Figure 4-7 illustrates the three dimensions in which resource can be logically 
classified, using levels, compartments, and groups. 
 
Figure 4-7 Resource Categorizations with Levels, Compartments, and Groups 
4.8.2  How Resource Label and User Label Work Together 
A user can only access resource within the range of his or his own label 
authorizations. A user has: 
• Maximum and minimum levels 
• A set of authorized compartments 
• A set of authorized groups (and, implicitly, authorization for any subgroups) 
For example, if a user is assigned a maximum level of SENSITIVE, then the user 
potentially has access to SENSITIVE, CONFIDENTIAL, and UNCLASSIFIED resource. 
The user has no access to HIGHLY_SENSITIVE resource. 
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Figure 4-8 shows how resource labels and user labels work together, to provide 
access control in Label Security. Whereas resource lab ls are discrete, user labels are 
inclusive. Depending upon authorized compartments ad groups, a user can potentially 
access resource corresponding to all levels within his range. 
 
Figure 4-8 Example: Resource Labels and user Labels 
As shown in the Figure 4-8, User 1 can access resouces 2, 3, and 4 because his 
maximum level is HS; he has access to the FIN compart ent; and his access to group 
WR hierarchically includes group WR_SAL. He cannot access resource 1 because he 
does not have the CHEM compartment. (A user must have uthorization for all 
compartments in a resource label, to access that row.)
User 2 can access resource 3 and 4. His maximum level is S, which is less than 
HS in resource 2. Although he has access to the FIN compartment, he only has 
authorization for group WR_SAL. He cannot, therefor, access resource 1. 
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Figure 4-9 shows how resource pertaining to an organizational hierarchy fits in to 
resource levels and compartments. 
 
Figure 4-9 How Label Components Interrelate 
For example, the DOMAIN group includes three subgroups: REGION_1, 
REGION_2, and REGION_1. The REGION_3 subgroup is further subdivided into 
AREA_1 and AREA_2. For each group and subgroup, there may be resource belonging 
to some of the valid compartments and levels within e network. Thus there may be 
SENSITIVE resource which is FINANCIAL, within the AREA_1 subgroup. 
Note that a resource is generally labeled with a single group, whereas users' labels 
form a hierarchy. If users have a particular group, that group may implicitly include child 
groups. Thus a user associated with the REGION_3 group has access to all resource; but 




 4.8.3  Access Mediation 
To access a resource protected by a label security policy, a user must have 
authorizations based on the labels defined for the policy. Figure 4-10 illustrates the 
relationships between users, resource, and labels. 
• Resource labels specify the sensitivity of resources. 
• User labels provide the appropriate authorizations t  users. 
• Access mediation between users and resource depends upon their labels. 
 
Figure 4-10 Relationships between Users, Resource, and Labels 
 
4.8.4  How Labels Are Evaluated for Access Mediation 
When a resource is protected by a label security policy, the user's label 
components are compared to the resource label components to determine whether the 
user can have access. In this way, security policy manager evaluates whether the user is 
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authorized to perform the requested operation on the resource. This section explains the 
rules and options by which user access is mediated. 
 
4.8.4.1 Example of Read/Write Authorizations on Groups 
When groups are organized hierarchically, a user's assigned groups include all 
subgroups that are subordinate to the group to which she belongs. In this case, the user's 
read/write authorizations on a parent group flow don to all the subgroups. 
Consider the parent group REGION_1, with three subgroups as illustrated in 
Figure 4-11. If the user has read access to REGION_1, he also has read access to the 
three subgroups. The administrator can give the user write access to subgroup 
WR_FINANCE, without granting his write access to the REGION_1 parent group (or to 
the other subgroups). On the other hand, if the user has read/write access on REGION_1, 
then he also has read/write access on all of the subgro ps subordinate to it in the tree. 
Write authorization on a group does not give a user write authorization on the 
parent group. If a user has read-only access to REGION_1 and WR_FINANCE, the 
administrator can grant his write access to WR_ACCOUNTS_RECEIVABLE, without 
affecting his read-only access to the higher-level groups. 
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Figure 4-11 Subgroup Inheritance of Read/Write Access 
 
4.8.4.2 Label Security Algorithm for Read Access 
READ_CONTROL enforcement determines the ability to read a resource. The 
following rules are used, in the sequence listed, to determine a user's read access to a 
resource: 
1. The user's level must be greater than or equal to the level of the resource. 
2. The user's label must include at least one of the groups which belong to the 
resource (or the parent group of one such subgroup). 
3. The user's label must include all the compartments which belong to the resource. 
If the user's label passes these tests, it is said to "dominate" the resource’s label. 
Note that there is no notion of read or write access connected with levels. This is 
because the administrator specifies a range of levels (minimum to maximum) within 
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which a user can potentially read and write. At anytime, the user can read all resources 
equal to or less than his current session level. No privileges (other than FULL) allow the 
user to write below his minimum authorized level. 
The label evaluation process proceeds from levels to groups to compartments, as 
illustrated in Figure 4-12. Note that if the resource label is null or invalid, then the user is 
denied access. 
 
Figure 4-12 Label Evaluation Process for Read Access 
As a read access request comes in, security policy manager evaluates each 
resource determine: 
1. Is the user's level equal to, or greater than, the lev l of the resource? 
2. If so, does the user have access to at least one of the groups present in the 
resource label? 
3. If so, does the user have access to all the compartents present in the resource 
label?  
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If the answer is no at any stage in this evaluation process, then security policy 
manager denies access to the resource, and moves on to evaluate the next resource. 
4.8.4.3 Label Security Algorithm for Write Access 
WRITE_CONTROL enables network admin control resource a cess with ever 
finer granularity. Granularity increases when compartments are added to levels; it 
increases again when groups are added to compartments. Access control becomes even 
finer grained when network admin can manage the user's ability to write the resource 
which he can read. 
To determine whether a user can write a particular resource, security policy 
manager evaluates the following rules, in the order given: 
1. The level in the resource label must be greater than or equal to the user's 
minimum level and less than or equal to the user's s ion level. 
2. When groups are present, the user's label must include at least one of the groups 
with write access which appear in the resource label (or the parent of one such 
subgroup). In addition, the user's label must include all the compartments in the 
resource label. 
3. When no groups are present, the user's label must have write access on all of the 
compartments in the resource label. 
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Just as with read operations, the label evaluation pr cess proceeds from levels to 
groups to compartments. Note that the user cannot write any resource below his 
authorized minimum level, nor above his current session level. The user can always read 
below his minimum level. 
Figure 4-13 illustrates how the process works with write operation. Note that if 
the resource label is null or invalid, then the user i  denied access. 
 
Figure 4-13 Label Evaluation Process for Write Access 
As an access request comes in, security policy manager evaluates each resource to 
determine: 
1. Is the resource's level equal to, or less than, the level of the user? 
2. Is the resource's level equal to, or greater than, the user's minimum level? 
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3. If the resource's level falls within the foregoing bounds, does the user have write 
access to at least one of the groups present in the resource label? 
4. If so, does the user have access to all the compartents with at least read access 
which are present in the resource label? 
5. If there are no groups, but there are compartments, then does the user have write 
access to all of the compartments? 
If the answer is no at any stage in this evaluation process, then security policy 
manager denies access to the resource, and moves on to evaluate the next resource. 
In addition, each user may have an associated minimum level below which he 
cannot write. He cannot write any resource labeled with levels below his minimum, nor 
can he write any resource with a resource label containi g a level less than his minimum. 
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4.9 Policy Management Language 
All the policy defined above need to be stored in the network. Flexibility and 
scalability are necessary for the format to be chosen. XACML (the Extensible Access 
Control Markup Language) can be used to meet the requirements. In general, XACML 
describes two key areas for security -- an access control policy language and a 
request/response language for two-way communications [35]. 
At the root of XACML is a concern with access policies -- what XACML refers 
to as a Policy or a Policy Set. When XACML refers to "policy," it specifically means 
Authorization (AuthN) Policy. 
Each XACML policy document contains exactly one Policy or Policy Set root 
XML tag. A Policy Set is a container that can hold ther Policies or Policy Sets, as well 
as references to policies found in remote locations. A Policy represents a single access-
control policy, expressed through a set of Rules.  
XACML defines and describes "layering" between XML entities to clearly 
distinguish between security technologies that:  
1. Create policy;  
2. Collect the data required for policy evaluation;  
3. Evaluate policy; and  
4. Enforce policy.  
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Because a generic Policy or Policy Set may contain multiple policies or Rules, 
each of which may evaluate to different access control decisions, XACML needs some 
way of reconciling the decisions each makes. In XACML, this is done through a 
collection of Combining Algorithms. Each algorithm represents a different way of 
combining multiple decisions into a single decision. XACML utilizes Policy Combining 
Algorithms (used by Policy Set) and Rule Combining Al orithms (used by Policy).  
The Deny Overrides Algorithm is an example of these indicating that no matter 
what, if any evaluation returns Deny, or no evaluation permits, the final result is also 
Deny. These Combining Algorithms are used to build p increasingly complex policies 
For Policy creation/enforcement, XACML brings several features, including:  
• The ability to include almost any property of any of the participants (or 
component) of the environment, not just the attribues of the requester;  
• The ability to use data manipulation and Boolean operators (in combination) to 
calculate the policy effect. This is especially usef l in complex policies with time, 
location, dollar amount or other multiple dependenci s; and  
• The ability to protect any sort of resource, with special handling for the important 
cases of hierarchical namespaces and portions of XML documents. 
For scalability, XACML brings:  
• The ability to independently administer multiple policies controlling access to the 
same resources;  
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• The ability to select (or define) algorithms for reconciling conflicting policies; 
and  
• The ability to efficiently locate all the policies that are potentially applicable to a 
given decision without sacrificing the flexibility described above. 
Figure 4-14 demonstrates a sample policy presented in XACML format.  
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Figure 4-14 A sample policy in XACML format 
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4.10 Performance Analysis 
Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector protocol (AODV) are two of the most commonly used protocols in Ad Hoc 
network routing. We are using DSR and AODV as base protocols, and apply proposed 
Policy Based Security module as plug-in to evaluate the routing overhead generated by 
the extra security layer. 
 
4.10.1 Simulation Model 
The implementations of AODV and DSR in our simulation environment closely 
match their specifications. The routing protocol model detects all data packets transmitted 
or forwarded, and responds by invoking routing activities as appropriate. The RREQ 
packets are treated as broadcast packets in the MAC. RREP and data packets are all 
unicast packets with a specified neighbor as the MAC destination. RERR packets are 
treated differently in the two protocols. They are broadcast in AODV and use unicast 
transmissions in DSR. Both protocols detect link breaks using feedback from the MAC 
layer. A signal is sent to the routing layer when the MAC layer fails to deliver a unicast 
packet to the next hop.  
Both protocols maintain a send buffer of 64 packets. It contains all data packets 
waiting for a route. To prevent buffering of packets indefinitely, packets are dropped if 
they wait in the send buffer for more than 30 seconds. All packets sent by the routing 
layer are queued at the interface queue until the MAC layer can transmit them. The 
interface queue has maximum size of 50 packets and is maintained as a priority queue 
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with three priorities each served in FIFO order. Routing packets get higher priority than 
security packets, and security packets get higher prio ity than data packets. 
The security management module is created by Object-oriented Tool Control 
Language (OTcl) as a plug-in implemented above the network layer. It generates and 
acknowledges all security related requests which have been discussed in the previous 
section. 
 
4.10.2  Simulation Assumptions 
We are using following assumptions in our simulations: 
• Nodes are randomly moving in a pre-defined two-dimension area. 
• Nodes have adequate memory to store require security pol cy data. 
• Nodes have adequate CPU power to handle security authentications. 
• Security policy of each node is pre-defined during the entire simulation. 
• Only security authentications overhead will be simulated, the overhead of 
security policy synchronization among each node will not be considered. 
• Security packets are considered as part of routing packets vs. data packets 
to calculate routing overhead. 
 
4.10.3  Traffic and Mobility models 
We use traffic and mobility models similar to those pr viously reported using the 
same simulator. Traffic sources are CBR (continuous bit-rate). The source-destination 
pairs are spread randomly over the network. Only 512 byte data packets are used. The 
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number of source-destination pairs and the packet sending rate in each pair is varied to 
change the offered load in the network. 
The mobility model uses the random waypoint model in a rectangular field. We 
use 1500m x 300m field with 50 nodes. Each node starts its journey from a random 
location to a random destination with a randomly chosen speed (uniformly distributed 
between 0-20 m/sec). Simulation period is 900 seconds. Each data point represents an 
average of at least five runs with identical traffic models, but different randomly 
generated mobility scenarios. Identical mobility and traffic scenarios are used across 
protocols. 
 
4.10.4  Metrics 
In comparing the protocols, we chose to evaluate them according to the following 
two metrics: 
Packet delivery ratio: the ratio between the number of packets originated by the 
application layer CBR sources and the number of packets received by the CBR sink at the 
final destination. 
Routing overhead: the total number of routing packets transmitted during the 
simulation. For packets sent over multiple hops, each transmission of the packet (each 
hop) counts as one transmission. 
Packet delivery ratio is important as it describes the loss rate that will be seen by 
the transport protocols, which in turn affects the maximum throughput that the network 
can support. This metric characterizes both the completeness and the correctness of the 
routing protocol. 
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Routing overhead is an important metric for comparing these protocols, as it 
measure the scalability of a protocol, the degree to which it will function in congested or 
low bandwidth environments, and its efficiency in terms of consuming node battery 
power. Protocols that send large numbers of routing packets can also increase the 
probability of packet collisions and may delay data p ckets in network interface 
transmission queues. 
 
4.10.5  Simulation Results 
Figure 4-15 and 4-16 highlight the relative performance of the four routing 
















































































Figure 4-16 Routing Performance 
 
All of the protocols deliver a great percentage of the originated data packets when 
there is little node mobility (at large pause time); converging to 100% delivery when 
there is no node motion. The regular DSR and AODV can deliver over 95% of the data 
packets regardless of mobility rate. The proposed th  policy based secure DSR (PSDSR) 
and policy based secure AODV (PSAODV) can achieve very close delivery ratio 
compared with the original protocols. 
The four routing protocols impose vastly different amount of overhead. DSR has 
overall better performance than AODV. The proposed cure protocols apparently 
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generate more overhead than original protocols, the routing packets increase about 10-
15% in secure protocols. 
The actual memory usage for the proposed security policy management in our 
simulation is not high, it remains below 1 megabyte. The distributed security policy 
synchronization process is not considered as overhead in our simulation. Because we 
believe in the real world scenario, the security policies don’t change often, and it usually 
can be done at off peak. 
 
4.10.5  Conclusion 
The simulation results indicate the proposed Policy Based Security approach has 
almost no impact on the packet delivery ratio of the original routing protocol, but it does 
result in an increase of an average of 10-15% of routing overhead regardless of mobility. 
This is because the proposed approach generates extra security packets which we 
consider as part of the routing packets as opposed to data packets.  
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Chapter 5     
 
Multi-Layer QoS Interface Guided Routing 
5.1 Introduction 
The QoS routing algorithms for wired networks cannot be applied directly to Ad 
Hoc networks. First, the performance of most wired outing algorithms relies on the 
availability of precise state information. However, the dynamic nature of an Ad Hoc 
network makes the available state information inherently imprecise. Though some recent 
algorithms [28][25] were proposed to work with imprecise information (e.g., the 
probability distribution of link delay), they require precise information about the network 
topology, which is not available in an Ad Hoc network. Second, nodes may join, leave, 
and rejoin an Ad Hoc network at any time and any locati n; existing links may disappear, 
and new links may be formed as the nodes move. Hence, the established paths can be 
broken at any time, which raises new problems of maintaining and dynamically 
reestablishing the routing paths in the course of data transmission. 
Recently, cross-layer design approaches [26] - [29]has been introduced into ad 
hoc wireless network to resolve the above issues. The cross-layer protocols are designed 
by violating the seven-layer open systems interconnect (OSI) model to provide overall 
better efficiency and performance in ad hoc wireless nvironment. Here the functionality 
of multiple layers are condensed into fewer layers with the view to improving 
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performance. The cross-layer designs are still at a very early research stage with lots of 
studies yet to be done. 
Instead of a cross-layer design approach, we choose a “hybrid” approach, which 
will still retain the seven-layer OSI model, but defin  an extra QoS interface for each 
layer to provide better “hand shake”. Compared with the cross-layer designs which 
require radical and complex changes to the protocol architecture, our approach is much 
easier to accomplish and can be implemented on existing ystems while providing 
improved QoS management and performance. Furthermor, the proposed holistic 
approach is novel as it considers the different facors that contribute to QoS at the 
different layers in contrast to traditional QoS routing protocols which work primarily on 
ensuring that the QoS requirements are satisfied at a specific level. 
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5.2 Multi-Layer QoS Interface Guided Routing 
We propose a multi-layer QoS interface guided routing, which separates metrics 
at the different layers, MAC layer metrics, network layer metrics, and application layer 
metrics. We believe the QoS requirements of an application is different from the QoS 
requirements of the network, but depends on the quality of the network. In our model, 
each layer manages its own QoS and communicates with other layers through its QoS 
interface.  
At the application layer, we propose to classify the QoS requirements into a set of 
QoS priority levels with their corresponding applicat on layer metrics. For example, we 
classify application requirements into three QoS level services. Level I guaranteed 
service corresponds to applications that have strong delay constraints, such as voice. 
Level II controlled load service is suitable for applications requiring high throughput such 
as video broadcasting applications. Level III best effort service has no specific constraints.  
At the network layer, we recommend using nodes’ hopc unt state, buffer state, 
and stability state to characterize the quality of network, and we call them network layer 
metrics. The hop count represents the number of hops required to a packet to reach its 
destination. The buffer state stands for the available unallocated buffer. The stability 
indicates the connectivity variance of a node with respect to its neighboring nodes over 
time. In our algorithm, we use this metric of each node in one specific route to calculate 
the path quality. 
At the MAC layer, the quality of network could mean li e signal to noise and 
interference ratio (SINR), and we call it MAC layer metrics. Link SINR determines the 
communication performance of the link: the data rate and associated probability of packet 
 62 
error rate or bit error rate (BER) that can be supported by the link. Links with low SINR 
are not typically used due their poor performance, leading to partial connectivity among 
all nodes in the network. Moreover, it is essential to minimize the volume of traffic being 
transmitted over the wireless interface because of the lack of wireless resources. This can 
be achieved via our interface mapping algorithm.  
In each layer, the layer specific QoS interface accepts requirements from higher 
layer, and translates into layer metrics. For example, network layer QoS interface accepts 
throughput service requirements from application layer, and translates into network layer 
metric such as buffer, power, and stability requirements. 
 
Figure 5-1 Network Layer Structure and QoS Metrics Mapping 
 
We utilize the QoS interface metrics defined above to guide the routing process, 
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which includes: 
• Path generation – generates paths according to the assembled and distributed 
state information of the network and application. 
• Path selection – selects appropriate paths based on the network and 
application state information. 
• Data forwarding – forwards user traffic along the selected path. 
Path generation is a process in which the quality of a path to route the data traffic 
is computed suing the quality of individual node in the path. The quality should not only 
reflect the available resources residing both in the wireless medium and in each node but 
also the stability of these resources. We use buffer level and stability level to characterize 
the quality of a node, and call them network layer metrics. With the knowledge of the 
quality of paths, an application selects the most suitable path according to the desired 
QoS level. For this purpose, application requirements are classified into three QoS level 
including guaranteed service, throughput service, and best effort service. In order to be 
able to compute these metrics, a reasonable combination of network layer metrics is 
mapped into the application layer metrics, which we defined as a QoS interface. Figure 5-
1 shows the mapping between QoS layers. 
In order to keep the routing overhead low and support fast routing decisions in 
QoS routing, we associate a state to the available network resources. In the path 
generation phase, the nodes use the state informatin to generate paths according to the 
available network resources. Then in the path selection phase, this state is used in 
conjunction with the desired QoS level to select the most suitable path according to the 
application requirements. The model differentiates s rvices and provides soft guarantees 
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to network resources for an admitted application by using a class-based weighted fair 
queuing (CB-WFQ) at intermediate nodes. 
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5.3 Path generation 
Unlike fixed networks such as the internet, QoS support in Ad Hoc networks 
depends not only on the available network resources but also on the nodes’ mobility rate. 
This is because mobility may result in link failure which in turn may result in a broken 
path. Furthermore, Ad Hoc networks potentially have fewer resources than fixed 
networks. Therefore, more criteria are required in order to capture the quality of the links 
between nodes. We propose to measure the quality of network and use it in the path 
generation process. We define network layer metrics o determine the quality of network 
in order to generate the good quality path.  
The main objective of network layer metric is to prvide a trade-off between load 
balancing and resource conservation. We define three network layer metrics: buffer level, 
hop count, and stability level. We assume that a node periodically broadcasts its network 
layer metrics to its neighbors, indicating its presence and its QoS state. 
Hop Count – corresponds to the number of hops requid to a packet to reach its 
destination. Note that the hop count metric is related to resource conservation, since a 
path with fewer hops is preferable. 
Buffer level – indicates the available unallocated buffer. This metric is related to 
load balancing. If the buffer level of a node is low, it implies that a large number of 
packets are queued up for forwarding, which implies that a packet routed through this 
node would have to experience high queuing delays. We use high, medium, low QoS 
states to represent the buffer level. A high QoS state indicates that the corresponding node 
has no packets queued up for forwarding. Since there is a delay between the broadcast of 
this metric and its use, instantaneous buffer level may be misleading. Hence, a node 
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should maintain the average buffer level. Exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) may be used. 
Stability level – we define the connectivity variance of a node with respect to its 
neighboring nodes over time as the stability of that node. The metric is used to avoid an 























N represent the nodes as neighbor of n at time it  and 1+it  
respectively. A node is unstable if a large number of its neighbors change. On the other 
hand, if most of the neighbors remain the same at the wo times it  and 1+it , then we call 




N ), in 
this case we have S(n) = 1. A node is unstable if all its neighbors change ( φ=
+1ii tt
NN I ), 
in this case we have S(n) = 0. We define a node stability level as below: 
LOW  0 <= S(n) < α 
MEDIUM α <= S(n) < β 
HIGH  β <= S(n) <= 1 
Where: 
 0 < α < β < 1 
 
In the path generation phase, network layer metrics are propagated through the 
nodes of the generated path. Suppose P is a path between source node s and destination 
node d, where P is a sequence of nodes, },,...,,,{ 21 dnnnsP i= . The formulas to calculate 
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The buffer level of P is represented by the node with the least buffer in P. This is 
appropriate for the route generation process, since a route is rendered broken even if one 
intermediate node has no buffer. Similarly, the stabili y level of P can also be calculated 
by the node with least stability on P. However, the buffer level of P can also be 







At the MAC layer, the quality of network could mean li e signal to noise and 
interference ratio (SINR), and we call it MAC layer metrics. Link SINR determines the 
communication performance of the link: the data rate and associated probability of packet 
error rate or bit error rate (BER) that can be supported by the link. Links with low SINR 
are not typically used due their poor performance, leading to partial connectivity among 
all nodes in the network. Moreover, it is essential to minimize the volume of traffic being 
transmitted over the wireless interface because of the lack of wireless resources. This can 
be achieved via our network layer to MAC layer interface mapping algorithm.  
Our algorithm will be greedy in that the information will be transmitted to the 
node which has the highest SINR, which means no matter what network layer QoS 
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requirements are, the algorithm always tries to choose the highest SINR nodes available 
to generate the path, unless the node buffer is full. On the other hand, as soon as one node 
buffer reaches full condition, the algorithm will suggest a lower QoS level path to use 
lower SINR node to protect the high QoS level path and thereby perform load balancing. 
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5.4 Path selection 
In order to incorporate application requirements in the path selection process, they 
need to be translated into QoS metrics that specify the application QoS constrains. Then a 
reasonable combination of network layer metrics is mapped into each QoS metrics. 
Furthermore, the MAC layer metrics are mapped into each network metrics.  
We define three QoS levels at the application layer, namely, guaranteed service, 
controlled load service, and best effort service. Guaranteed service corresponds to 
applications that have strong delay constraints, for example applications with real-time 
traffic such voice. The network layer QoS interface will translate this requirement into 
network QoS metric, which will select a path that hs minimum delay based on the 
average buffer level and hop count. Controlled load service is suitable for applications 
requiring high throughput such as video broadcasting. The network QoS interface needs 
to pick the highest buffer size path in this case to meet the application layer QoS 
requirements. Best effort service has no specific constraints. The network QoS interface 
will need select the most stable path and the shortest path. In fact, it selects the most 
stable path when the network mobility is high and the shortest path when the network 
mobility is low.  Table 5-1 shows the mapping between ach layer QoS metric. 
 
Application layer Network layer MAC layer 
Guaranteed Buffer & hop count SINR 
Controlled load Buffer & hop count SINR 
Best effort Stability & hop count SINR 
 
Table 5-1 QoS metrics mapping table 
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Guaranteed – guaranteed service defines the maximum latency required by the 
application. The total latency is experienced by a packet to traverse the network from the 
source to the destination. At the network layer, the end-to-end packet latency is the sum 
of processing delay, transmission delay, queuing delay, and propagation delay. Queuing 
delay contributes most significantly to the total latency and all other delays are negligible. 







Where n.buffer is the node unallocated buffer level, (n.bufferSize – n.buffer) 
denotes the node buffer occupancy. The formula can also be represented as: 
throughputPbufferPbufferSizePhopPlatencyP ./)..(.. −×=  
 
Where P.buffer denotes the path unallocated buffer level, and (P.bufferSize – 
P.buffer) denotes the path buffer occupancy. 
Controlled load – controlled load service define thminimum throughput required 
by the application. The throughput is the defined as the rate at which packets are 





















Best Effort – best effort service provides no service guarantees for the 
applications. It selects between the most stable path in the high mobility case and the 
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shortest path in the low mobility path case. In ourmodel, it uses P.stability to determine 
which path to choose. 
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5.5 QoS interface 
We use QoS interfaces to translate high layer QoS metrics to lower layer metrics. 
For instance, the QoS interface between the application layer and the network layer (AN 
Interface) will translate guaranteed service requirements into network layer buffer level 
and hop count requirements. Furthermore, the QoS interface between network layer 
metrics and the MAC layer (NM Interface) will use ntwork buffer level; hop count and 
stability number to determine the path SINR requirements at the MAC layer. 
Application 
layer 
AN Interface  Network layer NM Interface MAC layer 
















Table 5-2 QoS interfaces mapping table 
 
For guaranteed service, the AN interface translates th  QoS requirements to the 
maximum path latency, and pass to network layer as application layer QoS requirements. 
During the path selection process, the network lay will choose the qualified path by using 
the calculations defined in the last section, and using the network layer metrics as input 
parameter. 
For controlled load service, the AN interface transl tes the QoS requirements to 
the minimum path throughput, and pass to network layer as application layer QoS 
requirements. Network layer will choose the qualified path by calculate the path buffer 
level and hop count. 
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For best effort service, the AN interface compromises between the most stable 
path in high mobility case and shortest path in lowmobility path case. In the former case, 
it applies the stability metric to establish the most stable path from the source to the 
destination in order to improve delay performance du to path failure caused by the node 
mobility. In the latter case, it use hop count metric in order to minimize network resource 
utilization since the more hops a flow traverses, the more resources it consumes. 
Our NM interface uses a greedy method to insure that the information will be 
transmitted to the node which has the highest SINR, which means no matter what 
network layer QoS requirements are, the algorithm always tries to choose the highest 
SINR nodes available to generate the path, unless the node buffer is full. On the other 
hand, as soon as one node buffer reaches full conditi , the algorithm will suggest the 
lower QoS level path to use lower SINR node to protect he high QoS level path and 
perform load balancing. 
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5.6 Performance Analysis 
The performance of the proposed QoS routing protocol is studied with 
simulations.  
 
5.6.1  Simulation Model 
The QoS routing protocol has been implemented with ns2 [36]. The 
implementation is based on AODV module contributed by the MONARCH group from 
CMU, and the QoS routing functions are added. In additional to building QoS routes, the 
protocol also builds a best-effort route when it learns such a route. The best-effort route is 
used when a QoS route is not available. The Evolutionary-TDMA scheduling protocol 
(E-TDMA) [37] developed by the same authors is used at the MAC layer. It is distributed 
protocol which dynamically generates and updates TDMA transmission schedules among 
the nodes. Transmission rate is 1 Mbps. There are 40 slots in a frame, and a slot carries 
32 bytes of information. A packet needs to be transmitted in multiple slots if it cannot fit 
in one slot. Limited contention is used for nodes to make their time slot reservations, 
hence E-TDMA a mainly limited by nodal density rather than network size. Considering 
the overhead of making reservation, an information sl t is equivalent to 18 kbps. Details 
of E-TDMA can be found in [37]. In the simulations, Route_setup_time = 1000 ms and 
Route_life_time = 200 ms.  
The implementations of AODV and QoS-AODV in our simulation environment 
closely match their specifications. The routing protoc l model detects all data packets 
transmitted or forwarded, and responds by invoking routing activities as appropriate. The 
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RREQ packets are treated as broadcast packets in the MAC. RREP and data packets are 
all unicast packets with a specified neighbor as the MAC destination. RERR packets are 
broadcast in both AODV and QoS-AODV. Both protocols detect link breaks using 
feedback from the MAC layer. A signal is sent to the routing layer when the MAC layer 
fails to deliver a unicast packet to the next hop.  
Both protocols maintain a send buffer of 64 packets. It contains all data packets 
waiting for a route. To prevent buffering of packets indefinitely, packets are dropped if 
they wait in the send buffer for more than 30 seconds. All packets sent by the routing 
layer are queued at the interface queue until the MAC layer can transmit them. The 
interface queue has a maximum size of 50 packets and is maintained as a priority queue 
with three priorities each served in FIFO order. Routing packets get higher priority than 
security packets, and security packets get higher prio ity than data packets. 
Our multi-layer QoS interface guided routing protocol are implemented based on 
the existing QoS-AODV protocol in ns2. By expanding aodv.cc module in ns2, we add 
four more parameters in this module: node SINR, node buffer, node stability and link hop 
count. The detail algorithms of these parameters have been discussed in previous 
sections. 
 
5.6.2  Traffic and Mobility models 
We use traffic and mobility models similar to those pr viously reported using the 
same simulator. Traffic source are CBR (continuous bit-rate). The source-destination 
pairs are spread randomly over the network. Only 512 byte data packets are used. The 
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number of source-destination pairs and the packet sending rate in each pair is varied to 
change the offered load in the network. 
The mobility model uses the random waypoint model in a rectangular field. We 
use 1500m x 300m field with 50 nodes. Each node starts its journey from a random 
location to a random destination with a randomly chosen speed (uniformly distributed 
between 0-20 m/sec). Simulation period is 900 seconds. Each data point represents an 
average of at least five runs with identical traffic models, but different randomly 
generated mobility scenarios. Identical mobility and traffic scenarios are used across 
protocols. 
 
5.6.3  Simulation Results 
The multi-layer QoS AODV routing protocol (mQoS AODV) is compared with 
the QoS AODV and AODV protocols. 
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Figure 5-2 Throughput for v = 5 m/s 
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Figure 5-3 Average packets delay for v = 5 m/s 
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Figures 5-2 and 5-3 show the packet throughput and the average packet delay 
under different traffic loads in low mobility. Under light traffic, packet throughput and 
packet delay are very close for all three protocols, because they often use the same routes.  
The advantage of QoS routing protocols become apparent when traffic gets heavy. 
With the AODV protocol, a node has one active route to a destination and uses it for all 
the packets to the destination. As the network traffic becomes heavy, this route becomes 
heavily loaded, causing packets to be delayed and dropped. The average packet delay 
increases significantly under heavy traffic. On theother hand, the QoS routing protocols 
try to find and use routes satisfying bandwidth constraints for different flows, even 
between the same pair of source and destination. Two QoS routes may share the same 
path, but the protocol will ensure enough bandwidths are reserved on this path to 
accommodate both flows. The traffic load is more balanced this way. The average packet 
delay increases with offered load slowly with the QoS routing protocols. There is not 
much difference between two QoS protocols in low mobility. 
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Figure 5-4 Throughput for v = 10 m/s 
 
Figure 5-4 shows when mobility increases, the throughp t of all protocols drops. 
Mobility affects network throughput at both the MAC layer and the routing layer. At the 
MAC layer, it takes time for E-TDMA to resolve the collisions caused by node movement 
and to reserve new slots. Essentially a protocol like E-TDMA which is based on 
establishing reservation has only limited capability to handle network mobility and is best 
for a static network. At the network layer, it takes time for the routing protocol to re-
establish a route when it breaks. For the QoS routing protocols, the packet throughput 
drops roughly by 15% at v=10 m/s, compare with v=5 m/s.  
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Figure 5-5 Average packet delay for v = 10 m/s 
Figure 5-5 shows mobility also increases the average packet delay. The average 
packet delay increases roughly 50% at v=10 m/s, compare with v=5 m/s. Interestingly, 
when we compare the three routing protocols under mobility, the advantage of QoS 
routing protocols increases. Because the QoS routing protocols use different QoS routes 
for individual flows, when one of the QoS routes breaks, only this QoS route is repaired. 
Other are not affected. Packets of the flow on the broken route are temporarily forwarded 
using the best-effort route, which may coincide with one of the other QoS routes. There is 
more route redundancy with QoS routing (at the costof increased routing table size). In 
the AODV protocol, when the only route to a destination breaks, all packets addressed to 
this destination are delayed or dropped. It can be expected that a best-effort routing 
protocol which finds multiple routes will be better han AODV in this aspect. 
Also our proposed multi-layer QoS routing protocol performs better than 
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traditional QoS routing protocol during high mobility, because it’s always looking for 
more reliable paths during the path selection phase. Th  trade off is each node requires 
more memory to store path quality data. 
 
5.6.4  Conclusion 
The simulation results indicate the proposed multi-layer QoS routing protocol can 
produce higher throughput and lower delay than traditional QoS routing protocols in a 
high mobility ad hoc network environment. There is not much improvement under low 
network mobility. More internal memory is required for each node. 
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Chapter 6     
 
Security and QoS Optimization 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a need for a mechanism to dynamically manage security and QoS such 
that minimum user requirements are met. Although a user may specify minimum security 
and/or QoS requirements, the system should aim to provide the maximum security and/or 
QoS possible. Malicious attacks are unpredictable and unknown. Although the user may 
have specified a minimum requirement, the unpredictab li y of an attack in terms of its 
time, point of attack and maliciousness suggests that t e maximum security possible 
should be implemented in the network. This is particularly needed in a mobile ad hoc 
environment where there are no central or other significant points that can be monitored 
and the medium is open. A QoS that is more than the minimum specified is always 
desirable from a user perspective. In this dissertation, we propose an on-demand security 
and QoS optimization algorithm in a mobile ad hoc network, which can automatically 
adapt network security level along with changes in network topology, traffic conditions, 
and link QoS requirements - such as Guaranteed, controlled load, best effort, etc. to keep 
the security and QoS within the minimum requirements whilst aiming to providing more 
than the minimum security and QoS. In order to achieve this objective, we proposed two 
basic frameworks that are described in previous chapters: a policy based plug-in security 
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framework and multi-layer QoS guided routing. The plug-in security framework provides 
a dynamic security policy management system and the multi-layer QoS guided routing 
mechanism is an adaptable QoS routing mechanism for ad hoc networks to ensure QoS 
even as network resources change.  
Based on the above two fundamental frameworks, the proposed network security 
and QoS optimization algorithm uses proportional integral derivative (PID) feedback 
control to constantly monitor and adjust the network security policy to ensure that the 
network satisfies all existing QoS requirements while making the network the most 
secure possible. When network topology changes or traffic loads become heavier, 
causing existing QoS links to be broken, the algorithm will selectively remove some 
security policies to reduce overhead, until the QoS requirements can be satisfied. If a link 
in the path breaks, the multi-layer QoS guided routing mechanism is activated to realize a 
path with the desired QoS. Hence in the proposed appro ch two steps are taken to ensure 
that desired QoS and security are maintained: 
• Step 1: If the QoS is below the user specified level and the security level is above 
the minimum level, the security level is decreased to reduce the associated 
overheads.  
• Step 2: If there is break in the path, the multi-layer QoS guided routing 
mechanism is activated to obtain a path with the desired QoS. 
Alternatively if more available resources are available due to reduced traffic, the 
security level can be increased through the plug-in security framework. The proposed 
approach is equally applicable to a system where the priority is security. Here the QoS 
can be varied such that the required security is maintained. This approach is also 
 84 




6.2 Feedback Control Theory 
 We use proportional integral derivative (PID) contr l theory to achieve security 
and QoS optimization. 
 A typical feedback control system looks like figure 6-1: 
 
Figure 6-1 Feedback Control System 
Where 
Plant: A system to be controlled 
Controller: Provides the excitation for the plant; Designed to control the 
overall system behavior 

















Kp = Proportional gain  
KI = Integral gain  
Kd = Derivative gain  
The variable (e) represents the tracking error, the diff rence between the desired 
input value (R) and the actual output (Y). This error signal (e) will be sent to the PID 
controller, and the controller computes both the derivative and the integral of this error 
signal. The signal (u) just past the controller is now equal to the proportional gain (Kp) 
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times the magnitude of the error plus the integral ain (Ki) times the integral of the error 
plus the derivative gain (Kd) times the derivative of the error.  
dt
de
KedtKeKu DIp ∫ ++=  
This signal (u) will be sent to the plant, and the new output (Y) will be obtained. 
This new output (Y) will be sent back to the sensor again to find the new error signal (e). 
The controller takes this new error signal and computes its derivative and it’s integral 
again. This is an iterative process. 
A proportional controller (Kp) will have the effect of reducing the rise time and 
will reduce, but never eliminate, the steady-state error. An integral control (Ki) will have 
the effect of eliminating the steady-state error, but it may make the transient response 
worse. A derivative control (Kd) will have the effect of increasing the stability of the 
system, reducing the overshoot, and improving the transient response. Effects of each of 
controllers Kp, Kd, and Ki on a closed-loop system are summarized in the table shown 
below. 
CL RESPONSE RIST TIME OVERSHOOT SETTLING TIME S-S ERROR 
Kp Decrease Increase Small Change Decrease 
Ki Decrease Increase Increase Eliminate 
Kd Small Change Decrease Decrease Small Change 
Table 6-1 Proportional, integral and derivative contr ller 
 
Note that these correlations may not be exactly accur te, because Kp, Ki, and Kd 
are dependent of each other. In fact, changing one of these variables can change the effect 
of the other two. For this reason, the table should nly be used as a reference when you 
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are determining the values for Ki, Kp and Kd. 
For example if a modeling equation of this system is 
FkxbxMx =++ '''  
Taking the Laplace transform of the modeling equation 
)()()()(2 sFskXsbsXsXMs =++  












6.2.1  Proportional Control 
From the table shown above, we see that the proporti nal controller (Kp) reduces 
the rise time, increases the overshoot, and reduces the teady-state error. The closed-loop 













Figure 6-2 shows that the derivative controller reduced both the overshoot and the 




Figure 6-2 Derivative Controller 
 
6.2.2  Proportional-Integral Control 
From the table, we see that an integral controller (Ki) decreases the rise time, 
increases both the overshoot and the settling time, and eliminates the steady-state error. 













We have reduced the proportional gain (Kp) because the integral controller also 
reduces the rise time and increases the overshoot as the proportional controller does 





Figure 6-3 Integral Controller 
 
6.2.3  Proportional-Integral-Derivative Control 














Figure 6-4 shows the system with a PID controller has no overshoot, fast rise time, 





Figure 6-4 PID Controller 
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6.3 Security and QoS Feedback Control Loop 
We use PID feedback control loop to manage network security and QoS self-
optimization. 
Figure 6-5 demonstrates how optimization process works. Each application has 
QoS requirements as input sent into the network: Guaranteed, Controlled load or Best 
effort. In each node of the network, the QoS plant is a module of the routing protocol to 
handle the QoS request. Security policies are considered as another input to the network; 
all the security policies are implemented by the security plant, which is a module of the 
routing protocol to handle all security requests. The PID controller module takes the 
network resource usage metrics (path latency, path throughput and path stability) as 
system output feedback to calculate the adjustments which will be fed into the QoS plant 
and security plant. This PIC control loop will constantly keep the network in the 
optimized state – maximize network resource usage to sa isfy every QoS requests and 
make the network as  secure as possible. 
Network security is controlled by a policy based security management. This 
means the network security level can be adapted by the security plant module adding or 
removing security policies at runtime. 
The PID Controller collects all actual paths’ metrics from the entire network, and 
calculates network resource availability. If network resources are sufficient for more 
security policies, the PID Controller will choose more un-implemented security policies 
and apply to the network. Eventually, the algorithm will keep all existing paths satisfying 




Figure 6-5 QoS and Security PID Feedback Control Lop 
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6.4 Measure Network Resource Availability 
We use the application layer and network layer QoS metric parameter mapping to 






Network layer Metric 
Mapping 
MAC layer 















Table 6-2 QoS metric parameter mapping 
 
For guaranteed service, application-network layer mtric mapping translates the 
QoS requirements to the maximum path latency. If actual path latency is less than 
guaranteed service target path latency, this path hs sufficient resources to implement 


















 ettlatencyp arg. = target path latency at time S 
 requiredlatencyp. = required path latency at time S 
Kp = Proportional gain of path latency 
KI = Integral gain of path latency 
Kd = Derivative gain of path latency 
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For controlled load service, the application-network layer metric mapping 
translates the QoS requirements to the minimum path throughput. If actual path 
throughput is more than controlled load target path throughput, this path has sufficient 
resource to implement additional security policies. The target path throughput can be 

















 ettthroughputp arg. = target path throughput 
 requiredthroughputp. = required path throughput 
Kp = Proportional gain of path throughput 
KI = Integral gain of path throughput 
Kd = Derivative gain of path throughput 
 
For best effort service, the application-network layer metric mapping selects 
between the most stable path in the high mobility case and shortest path in the low 
mobility path case. There are no particular resource requirements in this case; all 
available security policies can be implemented. 
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6.5 Security Plug-in Architecture 
 An expansible security framework is the key to provide flexible security in an ad 
hoc network to achieve security and QoS optimization. We propose a policy based plug-
in architecture to provide dynamic security policy management at runtime. 
  
 
Figure 6-6 Network Security Policy Plug-in Architecure 
 
Figure 6-6 shows the proposed security policy plug-in architecture. The security 
policy manager keeps monitoring the network layer. If there are more network resources 
available, the security policy manager will get thenext available policy from the security 
policy stack, and activate it into the network as a plug module. If the network suffers 
from a lack of resources, the security policy manager will remove the least priority policy 
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from the network and add it back into the available security policy stack. 
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6.6 Optimization Algorithm 
Using the path monitoring and PID feedback control loop mechanism, each 
communication path can determine if there are extra resources available to support more 
security policies until the system reaches resource tilization target. If every path in the 
policy domain agrees the current resource is sufficient, the domain policy manager will 
choose the next security policy in the available policy stack, and deploy it to every node 
in the domain. 
 
6.6.1  Greedy algorithm 
We use a greedy algorithm for deploying security policies to reach network 
resource utilization target. As long as the network does not reach its resource utilization 
target, the policy manager will continue deploying new security policies into the network. 




Figure 6-7 Greedy Algorithm 
 
In real world scenario, it’s impossible to keep ad hoc network at target resource 
utilization due to various reasons, especially mobility. Therefore, we introduce the 
acceptable resource utilization, where: 
δ×= ettacceptable nUtilizationUtilizatio arg  
Where: 
 δ is the mobility factor (0 < δ < 1). 
 





Figure 6-8 Acceptable Utilization and Target Utilization 
 
NeedMorePolicy() routing shown in Figure 6-9 verifies if the actual resource 
utilization reaches acceptable utilization. It retuns TRUE if actual resource utilization is 
below acceptable utilization, otherwise it returns FALSE. As long as the 
NeedMorePolicy() routing returns TRUE, the security policy manager will keep 
deploying the next security policy from the available stack, until the resource usage 
reaches the target level, at which NeedMorePolicy() returns FALSE. After that, the PID 




Figure 6-9 Need More Policy Algorithm 
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6.7 Policy Deployment Post Validation 
The path monitoring and feedback control loop mechanism also need to verify 
that there is no existing path suffering from a lack of resources due to the new security 
policy deployment. If there is any path that is not able to satisfy the original QoS 
requirement, which means the previously deployed security policy is causing the network 
to suffer from resource starvation, the domain policy manager needs to remove the 
previously deployed security policy and log all thesuffering paths. The greedy algorithm 
will not be called until at least one of the suffering paths change state (e.g., finish 
communication, change QoS requirements, etc.). 








Figure 6-11 Policy Deployment Post Validation Algorithm 
 
 104 
6.8 Performance Analysis 
The performance of the proposed PID controlled security and QoS optimization 
algorithm is studied with simulations. Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector protocol 
(AODV) is one of the most commonly used protocols in ad hoc. In this study, we are 
using AODV as our base model, to compare with QoS AODV, static policy based secure 
AODV (PS-AODV) and the proposed PID optimized AODV (PID-AODV). 
 
6.7.1  Simulation Model 
The QoS routing protocol has been implemented with ns2 [36]. The 
implementation is based on AODV module contributed by the MONARCH group from 
CMU, and the QoS routing functions are added. In additional to building QoS routes, the 
protocol also builds a best-effort route when it learns such a route. The best-effort route is 
used when a QoS route is not available. The Evolutionary-TDMA scheduling protocol 
(E-TDMA) [37] developed by the same authors is used at the MAC layer. It is distributed 
protocol which dynamically generates and updates TDMA transmission schedules among 
the nodes. Transmission rate is 1 Mbps. There are 40 slots in a frame, and a slot carries 
32 bytes of information. A packet needs to be transmitted in multiple slots if it cannot fit 
in one slot. Limited contention is used for nodes to make their time slot reservations, 
hence E-TDMA a mainly limited by nodal density rather than network size. Considering 
the overhead of making reservation, an information sl t is equivalent to 18 kbps. Details 
of E-TDMA can be found in [37]. In the simulations, Route_setup_time = 1000 ms and 
Route_life_time = 200 ms.  
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The implementations of AODV, PS-AODV, QoS-AODV and the proposed PID-
AODV in our simulation environment closely match their specifications. The routing 
protocol model detects all data packets transmitted or forwarded, and responds by 
invoking routing activities as appropriate. The RREQ packets are treated as broadcast 
packets in the MAC. RREP and data packets are all unicast packets with a specified 
neighbor as the MAC destination. RERR packets are broadcast in both AODV and QoS-
AODV. Both protocols detect link breaks using feedback from the MAC layer. A signal 
is sent to the routing layer when the MAC layer fails to deliver a unicast packet to the 
next hop.  
All protocols maintain a send buffer of 64 packets. I  contains all data packets 
waiting for a route. To prevent buffering of packets indefinitely, packets are dropped if 
they wait in the send buffer for more than 30 seconds. All packets sent by the routing 
layer are queued at the interface queue until the MAC layer can transmit them. The 
interface queue has maximum size of 50 packets and is maintained as a priority queue 
with three priorities each served in FIFO order. Routing packets get higher priority than 
security packets, and security packets get higher prio ity than data packets. 
Our proposed PID-AODV routing protocol are implemented based on the existing 
QoS-AODV protocol in ns2. The PID control module is created by Object-oriented Tool 
Control Language (OTcl) as a plug-in implemented above the network layer. It collects 
path latency and throughput as network output parameters and sends security policy 
requests back to the network layer to perform optimization. 
 
6.7.2  Traffic and Mobility models 
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We use traffic and mobility models similar to those pr viously reported using the 
same simulator. Traffic sources are CBR (continuous bit-rate). The source-destination 
pairs are spread randomly over the network. Only 512 byte data packets are used. The 
number of source-destination pairs and the packet sending rate in each pair is varied to 
change the offered load in the network. 
The mobility model uses the random waypoint model in a rectangular field. We 
use 1500m x 300m field with 50 nodes. Each node starts its journey from a random 
location to a random destination with a randomly chosen speed (uniformly distributed 
between 0-20 m/sec). Simulation period is 900 seconds. Each data point represents an 
average of at least five runs with identical traffic models, but different randomly 
generated mobility scenarios. Identical mobility and traffic scenarios are used across 
protocols. 
 
6.7.3  Security Policies 
We use three security policies in our simulation: domain join authentication, read 
access authorization, write access authorization. Each security policy has been assigned a 
priority level. Depending on the network resource utilization ratio, the algorithm will add 
or remove security policies based on the priority leve  to maintain the QoS. 
Security policy Priority 
Domain join authentication High 
Write access authorization Median 
Read access authorization Low 
Table 6-3 Security policy priority 
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6.7.4  Simulation Results 
The proposed PID optimized AODV routing protocol (PID-AODV) is compared 
with the AODV, QoS AODV and static policy based secur  AODV protocols. 
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Figure 6-12 Throughput for v = 10 m/s 
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Figure 6-13 Average packets delay for v = 10 m/s 
 
Figures 6-12 and 6-13 show the packet throughput and the average packet delay 
under different traffic loads in mobility v = 10 m/s. Under light traffic, packet throughput 
and packet delay are very close for all three protocols, because they often use the same 
routes.  
The advantage of QoS routing protocols become apparent when traffic gets heavy. 
With the AODV protocol, a node has one active route to a destination and uses it for all 
the packets to the destination. As the network traffic becomes heavy, this route becomes 
heavily loaded, causing packets to be delayed and dropped. The average packet delay 
increases significantly under heavy traffic. On theother hand, the QoS routing protocols 
try to find and use routes satisfying bandwidth constraints for different flows, even 
between the same pair of source and destination. Two QoS routes may share the same 
path, but the protocol will ensure enough bandwidths are reserved on this path to 
accommodate both flows. The traffic load is more balanced this way. The average packet 
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delay increases with offered load slowly with the QoS routing protocols.  
Under light traffic, PID-AODV does not have much adv ntage in terms of 
performance compared with AODV and PS-AODV. As the network traffic becomes 
heavy, PID-AODV performs better. It provides a same level of security as PS-AODV, but 
has throughput and packets delay that is very close t  QoS AODV. It therefore provides 
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Figure 6-14 Security policies are used for v = 10 m/s
 
Figure 6-14 shows the number of security policies that have been used in PID-
AODV protocol at mobility v = 10 m/s. Initially, three security policies have been used 
under light traffic, because there is enough bandwidth resource in the network. When the 
traffic becomes heavier, the PID controller starts reducing the number of the security 
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policies to keep up the same performance as QoS AODV. Eventually, when the network 
traffic becomes too heavy, there is no extra bandwidth to handle any security feature, the 
security policy number drops to 0. 
 
6.7.5  Conclusion 
The simulation results indicate the proposed PID optimized security and QoS 
algorithm can produce similar performance as non-secure QoS routing protocol under 
various traffic loads.  
The level of security can be adaptable due to different traffic loads. The best case 
scenario is under light traffic where it can provide the same security level as any other 
secure protocols, but the same performance as non-secure QoS protocols; the worst case 
scenario is under extreme heavy traffic where it provides similar performance as QoS 
protocols, but with no security feature at all.  
Under normal traffic condition - medium traffic load, the proposed protocol can 




Chapter 7     
 
Network Security Measurement 
7.1 Introduction 
There are many routing protocols around including secure routing protocols. 
However, a question that arises is, how secure are these protocols? In other words, can 
we define a security metric? This is difficult, if not impossible. However, as proposed by 
[47] [48] we can come up with a relative comparison of the security of two protocols. In 
[47] [48], the vulnerabilities in the system are idntified and summed up to measure the 
security of the system. However, this approach is simplistic and does not reflect a true 
measure of security for a number of reasons.  
- A system may have many vulnerabilities, but it may still be secure because the 
goal of the attack is not realizable in this system. For example, DSDV routing 
can be very secure from routing table overflow attack but vulnerable from 
routing cache poisoning attack. 
- A system may have few vulnerabilities, but if there are multiple ways to 
exploit these vulnerabilities, the system is relatively insecure. 
- A system may have vulnerabilities, which if exploited on an individual basis 
pose little threat. However, if these vulnerabilities are exploited one after the 
other as a group, may have serious consequences. For example, a vulnerability 
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in the system results in an attacker obtaining the user ID. This by itself is not a 
major threat.  However, if the vulnerabilities can be exploited for the attacker 
to gain the user ID followed by the password, this is a very serious attack.  
In this chapter we propose a new approach to measuring security based on the 
parameters identified above – namely, any measure of s curity should be based on: 
- the vulnerabilities in the system, as described in [47] and [48] 
- The feasibility of realizing the attack goal  
- The number of different ways to exploit different or the same vulnerabilities 
to achieve the goal  
- The exposure of the system resulting from the exploitati n of multiple 
vulnerabilities 
In the proposed approach the vulnerabilities in the system are measured using the 
number of potential vulnerable resources in the system, the feasibility of realizing the 
attack goal is represented by a threat agent, and the number of different ways to achieving 
the attack goal is modeled using attack paths. We also defined the concept of an attack 




7.2  Fundamentals of Security and Attack 
 A successful system attack usually is caused by the existing of both internal 
system flaws and external threats. This section briefly discussed the basic concept of the 
fault path; fault path is the steps that external threat attacks internal system flaw to 
achieve system damage. 
 
7.2.1  Security and Dependability 
Security is a property of a system or service. A system is an entity that has internal 
structure and interacts with other systems. We are int rested in systems that are 
engineered; i.e. are developed and then operated to achieve some useful purpose. The 
purpose of the system is implemented as the service the system, acting as a provider, 
delivers to another system, the user system. 
The user system is dependent on the provider system for the service. The 
delivered service usually will have many properties, depending on its type. Among these, 
the user system will be concerned about the dependability of the provider system, or, 
equivalently, of the provided service [49]: 
1. The ability to deliver a service that can justifiably be trusted. (calls for a 
justification of trust) 
2. The ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is 
acceptable (implies criteria for deciding whether a service is dependable) 
The second definition indicates a measurement approch to dependability, based on the 
likelihood and severity of service failures. 
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A particular service can fail in a variety of ways, resulting in dependability being 
a composite property, covering the following more specific properties (more of the 
property is indicative of fewer or absence of the corresponding failures): 
Dependability Property of 
a System 
Associated Types of Service Failure 
Availability failures implied by the service being incorrect 
Reliability interruption or outage in correct service over a time interval 
Safety failures that cause catastrophic harm to users or the environment 
Integrity improper/unauthorized system alterations 
Maintainability service failures resulting from a system being difficult to 
successfully maintain during use 
 
Table 7-1 Dependability Property of a System 
 
Like dependability, security is a composite property of a system or service, with 
different sub-properties being associated with different types of service failure: 
Security Property of a 
System 
Associated Types of Service Failure 
Confidentiality unauthorized disclosure of information 
Integrity improper/unauthorized system alterations 
Availability types of failure implied by the term correct 
Authenticity A user not identified correctly – not who they claim to be 
Non-reputability A neutral third party is unable to decide if a particular transaction 
or event did or did not occur 
 
Table 7-2 Security Property of a System 
 
Definitions of security in the literature vary according to the types of failure that 
are of concern. The following are representative: 
1. Preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availab lity of information; in 
addition, other properties, such as authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation, and reliability can also be involved. 
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2. Work that involves ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
systems, networks, and data through the planning, aalysis, development, 
implementation, maintenance, and enhancement of information systems 
security programs, policies, procedures, and tools. 
Dependability and security overlap in the sense that some types of failure fall 
under both properties. For convenience, security will be discussed as a single property in 
the following. It is understood that, for a particular system or service, dependability and 
security will be defined as some selection from the sub-properties, depending on the 
concerns of the user system. 
The definition of dependability and security as theability to avoid failures raises 
the question of how a system or service can be measur d with regard to such ability. 
Before addressing this question, we need to define a model of how a service failure is 
caused. 
 
8.2.2  Faults and Errors 
A service failure implies that the provider system’s external states (i.e. those 
states observable by the user at the provider’s service interface) deviate from the external 
states associated with the provision of a correct srvice. This deviation is called an error. 
The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is called a fault. Faults may be located 
within the provider system and/or in its environment. 
Security vulnerability is a type of internal fault that enables an external fault to 
cause harm. An external fault may be the result of malicious actions of a threat agent. A 
system may have a property that is believed to remov  or mitigate a fault or set of faults. 
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Figure 7-1 illustrates a fault path linking three domains: a system/service 
environment, a system of interest that provides a service; and a user system in which 
service failures may cause damage. 
Faults can arise in any aspect of a system. Avizienis [49] provide an extensive 
typology of faults, along several dimensions. It is often a question of judgment as to the 
root cause of a failure, i.e. where a chain of dependability and security threats begins. For 
example, the presence of a fault in a software component may be due to a failure in the 




Figure 7-1 Fault Path 
 
 
7.2.3  Threats 
It follows from the definitions that security is a property of a system (and 
provided service) in relation to a threat environment. A given system may be acceptably 
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secure in one environment, but not in another; or it may be acceptably secure today but 
not tomorrow. 
Many types of fault of concern to security engineering are similar to safety faults: 
i.e. events in the natural environment, accidental, non-malicious actions during 
development etc. However, security has an additional type of fault arising from the 
presence of malicious threat agents in the operation l and development environment. 
Such agents can learn and adapt, resulting in evolving external faults. 
Attack Trees are used to map the objectives of a threa  agent onto vulnerabilities 
of the system. Alternative attack sequences represent th  possible ways the agent might 
achieve his/her goal. Development and operational policies can be adjusted to prioritize 
defensive actions. 
Measurement can support the decision making involved, for example in the 
estimation of the cost to a threat agent of different attack sequences. Under certain 
assumptions, an increase in attack cost would imply a lowering of the likelihood of the 
attack sequence occurring and an increase in security with regard to the associated 
service failure. 
 
7.2.4  Security Principles and Policies 
The security field is a large one – information security is perhaps the most general 
term (to which might be added control system security). The fields of computer security, 
network security and software security are more specialized areas of professional 
engineering practice. Each has more specialized areas of expertise. System security 
engineering addresses the concerns from the viewpoint of software-intensive systems, 
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compatible with systems engineering as defined by ISO/IEC 15288 and related standards. 
The overlap with system safety engineering has beenaddressed in recent years [50]. 
The long history of computer security has established several principles that are 
used to guide the architectural design and operation of secure computer-based systems. 
They can be viewed as being expressed through design policies and requirements and 
include [51]: 
1. Accountability; 
2. Least privilege; 
3. Minimize the variety, size and complexity of trusted components; 
4. Secure default configurations; 
5. Defense in depth. 
Such principles guide strategic design choices thatreduce the likelihood of common 
types of service failure. Security principles are implemented using a selection of security 
mechanisms, for example [51]: 
1. Defining and implementing domains, i.e. areas of stred data and applications 
with restricted access; 
2. Linking users with domains; 
3. Authorizing operations; 
4. Auditing operations; 
5. Cryptography. 
Security mechanisms are implemented by a range of security components (i.e. 
components whose primary functions are security-related) forming the security 
architecture of the system, and operations policies. Systems and software security 
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engineering specialties are responsible for specifying, designing and implementing these 
systems, and for supporting general systems and software engineering functions in 
realizing the security properties of the total system product. 
Measurements can be developed to (1) assess the degree to which an implemented 
and operated system meets the design intent and (2) the degree to which the design intent, 




7.3 Attack Surface 
The concept of Attack Surface model introduced in [47] [48] measures computer 
Operating System vulnerability and attack ability. The attack surface model uses state 
machines to represent all potential system resources that can be used by an attacker to 
achieve an attack goal. These vulnerabilities are described as “dimensions”, and they are 
compared to provide a measure of relative security. In this approach, rather than saying 
“System A is secure” or “System A has a measured security number N” the attack surface 
model says “System A is more secure than System B with respect to a fixed set of 
dimensions.” 
The attack surface models an attack as a three dimens on model: target, carrier 
and communication channel. Target is the attack goal; carrier is the media by which an 
attacker passes the attack to the target, the examples of carriers include viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses, and email messages; communication cha nels are the means by which the 
attacker gains access to the targets on the system. The attack surface model uses the 
matching mechanism to identify system security exposure. If any system data and process 
can be identified as an attack target, carrier or communication channel, they are counted 
as security exposure. The overall count is summation of the dimensions from the attack 
surface metric for the system. 
However, the state machine model of a threat used in the attack surface model 
does not precisely represent a real world threat; it simply lists all system resources that 
are utilized by the threat as one single level – without dependency, and give equal weight 
– same importance to all these resources. But a real world threat might have one or more 
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attack sequences, where some of the steps in the attack sequence can be more critical than 
others, or depends on the successful attack of multiple sub-sequences. 
For example, a system A that exposes both user name and password is more 
vulnerable than a system B that exposes both employee salary and password, although all 
of the above information are been classified as senitive data. An attacker can cause more 
serious damage to system A than system B by using a stolen identity to successfully login 
into system A. The attack surface model, however, masures the same vulnerability level 
for both system A and system B in this scenario. 
In the next section, we propose a new state machine model of threat. Each threat 
will be associated with an attack tree; there might be one or more critical paths within an 
attack tree. Therefore, some system resource can be weighted more than others, 
depending on where it is located in the attack tree. 
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7.4  Proposed Measurement Technique 
7.4.1 Vulnerability Assessment and Security Measurement 
We want a measure at a lower abstraction level that allows us to refer to very 
specific states of a protocol [54]. There are certain protocol features that are more likely 
than others to be opportunities of attack, such as sending information to an 
unauthenticated node, etc. The counts of these “more likely to be attacked” protocol 
features determine a protocol’s attack opportunity. 
Suppose we are given a fixed set of dimensions and a fixed set of attack 
opportunities for each dimension. Then with respect to his fixed set of dimensions of 
attack opportunities, we can measure whether protocol A is “more secure” than protocol 
B. 
We use state machines to model the vulnerability of pr tocol A and B. Our 
abstract model allows protocol A and B to be any two state machines. In practice, it is 
more useful and more meaningful to compare two protocols that have some close 
relationship.  
The abstract dimensions along which we compare two protocols are derived 
directly from our state machine model: process and data resources and the actions that we 
can execute on these resources. For a given threat agent, which we define to be a 
sequence of action executions, we distinguish attack goal from attack path: attack goal 
are processes or data resources that an attacker aims to control, and attack path are all 
other processes and data resources that are used by the attacker to carry out the attack 
successfully. The attacker may use a set of attack goals (attack objective), attack paths 
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(sequence of steps to achieve an attack goal) and critical paths (the primary attack paths 
to cause system failure) to accomplish the ultimate at ack goal. Control is subject to the 
constraints imposed by a protocol’s set of access rights. In summary, our threat agent 
metric’s four dimensions are: Attack Goal, Attack Path, Critical Path and Access Rights.  
Figure 7-2 demonstrates the process flow of network security measurement metric 
generation and the four dimensions of the security measurement metric. 
 
Figure 7-2 Network Security Measurement Metric 
 
7.4.2 State Machine 
We model both the protocol’s vulnerability and the reat agent as state machines. 
A state machine has a set of states, a set of initial s ates, a set of actions, and a state 
transition relation. We model an attack as a sequence of executions of actions that ends in 
a state that satisfies the attacker’s goal, and in which one or more of the actions executed 
in an attack involves vulnerability. 
A state machine, M = (S, Σ, T, s, A), is a 5-tuple, 
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Where: 
a finite set of states (S)  
a finite set called the alphabet (Σ)  
a transition function (T: S × Σ → S).  
a start state (s ∈ S)  
a set of accept states (A⊆ S)  
 
A state S is a mapping from typed resources to their yped values: 
  S: Resource(M) → Value(M) 
 
Of interest to us are state resources that are processes and data. A state 
transition,( )',, ss σ , is the execution of action σ in state s resulting in state s’. A change in 
state means that either a new resources is added to the mapping, a resource was deleted, 
or a resource changes in value. We assume each state transition is atomic. 
An execution of a state machine is the alternating sequence of states and action 
executions: 
......... 122110 iii sssss →×→×→× − σσσ  
 
An execution can be finite or infinite. If finite, it ends in a accept state A. 
The behavior of a state machine, M, is the set of all its executions. We denote this 
set Behavior(M). A state S is reachable if either S ∈s or there is an execution, E 
∈Behavior(M), such that S in E. 
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We will assume that action are specified by pre- and post-conditions. For an 
action, σ, if σ.pre and σ.post denote σ’s pre- and post-condition specifications, we can 
then define the subset of the transition relation such as: 
{ })',(.)(.|:',,. sspostspreSSssT σσσσ ⇒×Σ×=  
 
We model both the network vulnerability and the threat agent as state machines: 
),,,,(ln VVVVV AsTSerabilityVu Σ=  
),,,,( TTTTT AsTStThreatAgen Σ=  
 
We define the combination of the two state machines, S curity = Vulnerability x 
ThreatAgent, by merging all the corresponding components: 
• SValue Re2 →⊆ SsourceSS  
• TVS sss ∪=  
• TVS AAA ∪=  
• TVS TTT ∪=  
 
An attacker targets a network under attack to accomplish a goal: 
 Network-Under-Attack = (NetworkVulnerability x ThreatAgent) x Goal 
Where Goal is formulated as a predicate over states in SS . 
 
7.4.3  Modeling Threat Agents 
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Factors involved in assessing the security risk posed by a particular agent have 
been modeled by [52] (Figure 7-3). These factors can be assessed on the basis of 
qualitative scales, enabling risks to be prioritized. For example, the threat capability of a 
group of terrorist threat agents might be assessed on the basis of [52]: 
1. Group size; 
2. Level of education; 
3. Cultural factors; 
4. Access to communications and the Internet; 
5. Technical expertise; 
6. History of activity; 






Figure 7-3 Aspects of a threat agent 
 
 
Let M = (S, Σ, T, s, A) be the state machine representing the network under attack 
and the goal the state predicate characterizing the a tacker’s goal to be achieved in 
attacking the network. 
A threat agent is a finite sequence of action executions ni σσσσ ,......,......, 21 such 
that: 
ni ≤≤∀1 ; 
Σ∈iσ . 
A threat agent includes actions from the action sets of the network, the threat. 
Since an attack is initiated by the threat, the sequence starts with an action of the threat. 
The sequence includes at least one action of the network to model the exploitation of 
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some network vulnerability by the threat in the attack. Finally, the attacker’s goal should 
hold at the end of the attack path. 
 
7.4.4  Modeling Attack Tree 
The level of threat (potential to cause damage) of a threat agent is also influenced 
by their motivation and opportunities to access the system, among other factors.  
An attack tree is defined as a tuple G = (V, E, f), 
Where: 
  V is a finite set of vertices (attack goals); 
  E is a finite set of edges (attack steps); 
  f is a logic function that maps a vertices into an AND/OR tree. 
An attack path is a finite sequence of vertices and edges from a leaf node to the 
root of an attack tree nii vevevev ......,,......,,, 2211 such that: 
ni ≤≤∀1 ; 
Vvi ∈ ; 
Eei ∈ . 
Attack trees model the particular attack goals and the options for achieving them 
in relation to the attacked system. A top-level goal (Figure 7-4) is decomposed into sub-
goals in an AND/OR tree. The path from a leaf node to the top-level root is an attack 
path. The set of all identified threats to a system from a particular threat agent is the 






Figure 7-4 Attack tree 
 
 
Attack trees may be used to integrate quantified assessments of the costs to the 
attacker in achieving the goal at each node. Alternatively, a probability of success may be 
associated with each node, based on judgments about the threat presented by the agent 
and the protection presented by the system. If probabilities could be assigned to nodes, 
the likelihood of a successful attack could be asses ed from the probabilities along the 
complete network of potential attack paths. The security risk associated with the attack is 
assessed from the costs associated with the effects of the successful attack. 
In addition to the probability and cost aspects, measurements can also be based on 
tracking identified threats and attack paths (as in a project risk register); the number of 
threats (top level goals) and attack paths, under sel cted categories, can be tracked over 
time. Time and costs associated with mitigation actions can be tracked. 
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The particular form of attack goals and sub-goal strategies will depend on the 
target system and assets. For example, threat effects have been classified as follows in the 




4. Information disclosure; 
5. Denial of service; 
6. Elevation of privilege. 
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7.5 Security Measurement Metric 
We define the notion of threat agent and security measurement more formally and 
in terms of a different state machine model. The significant difference in our state 
machine model is in making the access matrix explicit and in distinguishing the system as 
an entity different from its principals.  
We present a method of applying our metric so that others can use the notion of 
security measurement for any network. The method requi s identifying resources that 
are potential goals of threat agents and identifying interesting properties of the resources 
to characterize their attackability. We also allow users to specify a penalty function for 
attacks, to help determine what attacks to use for comparing two network protocols. 
 
7.5.1  Dimensions of a Threat Agent 
• Attack Goal 
To achieve the attack goal, the attacker has one or more sub-goals on the network 
to attack. An attack goal is a distinguished process or data resource in network 
that plays a critical role in the attacker’s achieving his goal.  
• Attack Path 
We use the term path for any accessed process or data esource that is used as part 
of the means of the attack but is not signed out to be a target. 
• Critical Path 
Critical path is a set of attack paths that the attacker may use to achieve the 
ultimate attack goal.  
 132 
• Access rights 
These rights are associated with each process and dta resource of a state 
machine. 
Intuitively, the more attack goals the threat agent has, the less secure the network. 
The more attack paths the threat agent has, the less s cure the network. The smaller 
attack trees the threat agent has, the less secure of th  network. The more generous the 
access rights, the less secure the network. 
 
7.5.2  Attack Goal and Attack Path 
Attack goal and attack path are resources that an att cker can use. There are two 
types of resources: processes and data. It’s a matter of he attacker’s goal that determines 
whether a resource is an attack goal or an attack pth. In particular, an attack goal in one 
attack might simply be an attack path for a different threat agent, and vice versa. 
Examples of process targets are message sending, routing table updating, and 
password changing. Example of data goals are access right , routing tables, important 
files and data stored on specific nodes in network. 
Part of calculating the security metric is determining the types and numbers of 
instances of potential process goals and data goals. 
 
7.5.3  Critical Path 
Critical path is one or multiple attack paths that an attacker can use to achieve the 
ultimate attack goal. Figure 7-5 uses a different color scheme to demonstrate that there 
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are a total of 4 different critical paths within a single attack tree. In this scenario, an 
attacker can use 4 different attack methods to achieve the top-level attack goal. If any one 
of the attack methods can be successfully executed, th  attacker will successfully attack 
the system. Notice Attack Goal 1.2 is shared by two critical paths, which means there are 
certain system resources that can be used by multiple attack methods. 
 
 
Figure 7-5 Critical path of attack tree 
 
7.5.4  Access rights 
We associate access rights with all resources. Conceptually we model these rights 
as a relation, suggestive of Lampson’s original access control matrix [55]: 
Access ⊆ Principals x Resources x Rights 
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Where  
 ocessesUsersincipals PrPr ∪=  
 Dataocessessources ∪= PrRe  
Reducing the network vulnerability with respect to access rights is a special case 
of abiding by Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only the relevant rights to each of the 
principals who are allowed access to a given resource. 
 
7.5.5  Examples 
The following are some examples of the proposed security measurement metric. 
Assuming our network uses the AODV protocol, for common network attacks like 
sniffing/snooping and message alternation, our resource table is shown: 
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Attack 1: sniffing/snooping 









1. Unencrypted  sensitive data Y  Y Read 
2. Unencrypted password Y   Read 
3. Unencrypted user name Y   Read 
4. Encrypted sensitive data    Read 
5. Encrypted password    Read 
6. Message sender  Y  Send 
7. Message receiver    Receive 
8. Message contain password  Y  - 
9. Message contain user name  Y  - 
10. Message contain sensitive data  Y  - 
11. User identity Y  Y - 
 
Table 7-3 AODV under sniffing attack 
 
Pre-conditions: 
o Message sends from sender node to receiver node. 
o Message contains sensitive data and password. 
o Message is not encrypted. 
Attack sequence: 
• Attacker listens to victim network. 
• Sender sends message to receiver. 
• Attacker capture messages before it actually reach destination receiver. 
Post-conditions: 
• Arbitrary, depending on the payload. 
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Attack 2: message alternation 





Critical Path Access right 
1. Unencrypted data    Read 
2. Unencrypted data Y   Read, Write 
3. Encrypted data    Read 
4. Encrypted data    Read, write 
5. Message sender    Send 
6. Message receiver    Receive 
7. Data carried by message  Y  - 
8. Modified data received by 
receiver 
Y  Y - 
 
Table 7-4 AODV under message alternation attack 
 
Pre-conditions: 
o Message sends from sender node to receiver node. 
o Message is not encrypted. 
Attack sequence: 
• Attacker listens to victim network. 
• Sender sends message to receiver. 
• Attacker captures message before it actually reach destination receiver. 
• Attacker modifies data inside of the message. 
• Attacker sends message to receiver. 
Post-conditions: 
• Arbitrary, depending on the payload. 
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7.6 Security Measurement 
We define the network security measurement to be a function of attack goal and 
attack path, the critical path associated with each type of the attack goal and attack path, 
and access rights that constrain the access to all resource.  
),_,,( rightspathcriticalpathgoalfSECURITY=  
 
This equation can also be represented in the form of sum of independent resource 
contributions from a set of attack goal types, a set of attack path types, a set of critical 
path types. The attack goal types and attack path types are subject to the constraints of the 
access rights relation, the critical path type depends on the availability of attack goal 






rights SECURITYSECURITYSECURITYSECURITY , _++=  
 
The security measurement of a network consists of the set of network actions Σ 
and the collective set of resources of each actioniσ . A naïve but impractical way of 
measuring the security is to enumerate the set of network actions of a given network and 
count the number of resources in each of the action’s resource set. We describe below a 
more practical, yet meaningful way to measure the security based on the attacks of the 
network. 
Consider a network with a fixed set, Σ, of network actions, each specified in terms 
of pre- and post- conditions. 
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σ )(Re  from the given set of network actionsNΣ . Let Type be the set of types 
all these resources. 
Step 2: For each given threat agent, identify resource that att ck is targeting as 
attack goal and attack path. 
Step 3: Identity critical paths within the attack tree – some attack goals require 
attack sequences in multiple attack paths to accomplish the attack goal. Verify if all 
resources are available within the critical path. 
Step 4: Define a penalty function P:  Attack → [0, 1] to assign penalties to each 
resource categories identified in step 2. 
Step 5: Loop through network resource set identified in step 1, determine whether 
each resource falls in attack resource category identified in step 2. SECURITY = 
SECURITY + penalty, if there is any. 
Step 6: The final result indicate the overall security risk of the network. Compare 
the two versions of the protocol, A and B, with resp ct to these k threat agents to obtain 
their relative security risk exposure. 
 
Figure 7-6 demonstrates the process to generate the security measurement metric 
on a simplified AODV under sniffing attack. This process can be interpreted as the 
following steps: 
1. Create an attack tree of sniffing attack.  
2. Create the network resources list. 
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3. Identify attack goals, attack paths and critical paths from the attack tree. 
Mark “Y” for each attack goal, attack path, and criti al path in threat agent 
metric.  
Attack goals:  
• sensitive data 
• user identify 
• user name 
• password 
Attack paths:  
• data message 
• message sender & receiver 
• non-secure communication channel 
Critical paths, there are two critical paths in this attack tree:  
• [obtain sensitive data]  
• [obtain user name, obtain password] -> [obtain useridentity] 
4. Map network resources to attack goals, attack paths, nd critical paths of 
the threat agent. 
5. Create the network under attack metric based on the network resources’ 
access rights. 
6. Loop through each resource of network under attack metric. Penalty = 
Penalty + 1, if there are any “Y” marked for this resource. 
7. Calculate the total of penalty column in network under attack metric. 
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In this case, security measurement number is 10. The higher number indicates 
more security risks, in other words, the network is less secure. 
 
 
Figure 7-6 Security metric of AODV under sniffing attack 
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Reducing network security risk 
Our formal model and measurement method suggest ways in which we can reduce 
the exposure of network security risk: 
• Reduce the number of network activities(for example, reduce the number of 
messages); 
• Remove known or potential network vulnerability by strengthening the pre- 
and post- conditions of a network action Σ, in a way that prevents the goal of 
the threat from ever being achieved. 
• Eliminate entire threat; 
• Reduce the number of instances of threat. 
• Implement more security protections. 
 
Advantages 
The use of security measurement metric has the following advantages: 
• First, our metric is a relative measure of security. It is difficult to identify a 
yardstick for measuring a network’s absolute security. Instead, we find it more 
practical and more useful to compare the security of two protocols of a 
network with a given set of attacks. Our metric can be used to determine 
whether a new protocol is more secure than an earlier version. Figure 7-7 
demonstrates the relationship among threat agents, ne work vulnerabilities, 
and security measurement. 
• Second, our metric can be used to track the security level of the network over 
time by measuring the threat agent and network vulnerability at regular 
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intervals. We can observe the change in security level as different resources 
are turned on and off as required. 
• Third, our metric can also be used to compare the security risk of the same 
network protocol against different threat agents. In this case, penalty function 
can return different numbers depends on the resource type other than [0, 1]. 
Figure 7-8 demonstrates the relationship among threa  agents, network 
vulnerabilities, and security measurement in this application. 
 
 




Figure 7-8 Measure security among different threats 
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7.7 Example of Security Measurement Metric 
We used our method to measure 10 of the most common ad hoc network attacks 
on AODV and DSDV routing protocols, assuming both environments have the same 
network topology and node movement. 
10 common ad hoc network attacks Description 
Sniffing/snooping Monitoring the network for sensitive data and 
passwords. 
Message replays Sending a message repeatedly to a receiver 
(replay attack). 
Message alternation Modifying a message and sending. 
Message delay and denial Lowering or removing QoS in a network (AKA 
denial of service). 
Spoofing Making a packet appear to come from locatin 
other than the one from which it was sent. 
Remote redirection  Remote redirection with modifie route 
sequence number 
Redirection with modified hop count Redirection with modified hop count 
Attacks using impersonation  Attacks using impersonation  
Route cache poisoning Route cache poisoning 
Routing table overflow Routing table overflow attack  
 
Table 7-5 10 most common attacks in ad hoc network 
Our calculation show DSDV has higher security risk compare with AODV, which 
means DSDV has higher chance to be attacked – less secure. 
Attack AODV DSDV 
Sniffing/snooping 10 10 
Message replays 5 3 
Message alternation 4 3 
Message delay and denial 5 3 
Spoofing 5 3 
Remote redirection 5 3 
Redirection with modified hop count 4 4 
Attacks using impersonation 4 4 
Route cache poisoning 0 0 
Routing table overflow 6 3 
Total 48 36 
 
Table 7-6 Attack measurement of AODV and DSDV 
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From the above analysis we can conclude that AODV is more secure than DSDV. 
The table-driven protocol DSDV periodically broadcasts messages to maintain an 
updated routing table, whereas this is not required by AODV. The number of routing 
messages involved in DSDV is more than in the demand-driven protocol AODV. Since 
messages play a big role in facilitating a network attack path in our model, this becomes 
the one factor to cause DSDV to have a higher security risk than AODV. DSDV also 
requires each node to maintain a routing table which can be used as attack goal and even 




Our state machine is a general model of network behavior and attack. Our security 
measurement method can be applied to any network. Our application of measuring 
relative metric to AODV and DSDV shows the relative security of the two protocols. 
Measuring security has been a long-standing challenge to the community. The 
need to do so has recently become more pressing. We view our work as a first step in 
solving this research problem. We suggest that the best way to begin is to start counting 
what is countable; then use the resulting numbers in a qualitative manner. Perhaps over 





Chapter 8     
 
Conclusions and Future Works 
8.1 Overall conclusion 
In this research, our main contribution has been to optimize security and QoS in 
Ad Hoc networks. We have studied four aspects of QoS and security in Ad Hoc 
networks: 
• A policy based security architecture is proposed ansimulation research 
shows that the associated overheads are not significa t; 
• A multi-layer QoS guided routing algorithm is shown to provide more 
efficient and reliable QoS; 
• An architecture to optimize QoS and security provides optimum QoS and 
security; 
• A new metric to measure the relative security of AdHoc protocols is 
presented. 
The proposed on-demand security and QoS optimization architecture has been 
evaluated using the network simulator ns-2. The simulation results show that the 
proposed optimization architecture can produce similar performance as non-secure QoS 
routing protocol under various traffic loads. It provides more secure ad hoc networks 
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without compromising the QoS performance, especially under light and medium traffic 
conditions. 
The proposed network security measurement method all ws us to measure the 
relative security between two or more routing protoc ls. Our application of measuring 




8.2 Policy Based Security 
8.2.1  Conclusion 
The proposed distributed policy based security archite ture provides a flexible 
and scalable network security approach that fits in w th the dynamic and distributed 
nature of ad hoc networks. Security policies can be used as a plug-in module for any of 
the existing ad hoc routing protocols. Simulation results indicate that although there is 
overhead introduced to the routing protocols; it is w thin an acceptable range. Given the 
increasing sophistication of computers, cell phones, PDAs etc., that now form ad hoc 
networks, as well as the increasing complexity of the services such networks provide, the 
proposed scheme provides a much needed additional level of security to the existing 
security approaches based on secure routing and intrusion detection. The proposed 
scheme therefore complements secure routing and intrus on detection.  
 
8.2.2  Future Work 
Future work will involve more research into the overhead of security 
management. Besides the communication overheads, more work is needed on identifying 
the memory requirements for implementing such a system. Another area than needs 
further work is the synchronization of distributed security policies in real-time. 
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8.3 Multi-layer QoS Interface Guided Routing 
8.3.1  Conclusion 
Quality-of-service (QoS) routing in an Ad Hoc network is difficult because 
network topology may change constantly, and the available state information for routing 
is inherently imprecise. In this dissertation, we propose a multi-layer QoS surface guided 
routing, which separates metrics at the different layers, MAC layer metrics, network layer 
metrics, and application layer metrics. Our model considers not only the QoS 
requirement, but also the cost optimality of the routing path to improve the overall 
network performance.  
Achieving QoS at high mobility is a difficult problem and the simulation results 
indicate the proposed multi-layer QoS routing protoc l can produce higher throughput 
and lower delay then traditional QoS routing protocls in a high mobility ad hoc network 
environment.  The proposed protocol does not provide much improvement under low 
network mobility. The main drawback with the proposed protocol is the need for more 
internal memory at each node.  
 
8.3.2  Future Work 
Future work will analyze the factors that contribute to QoS at each layer and the 
amount of extra memory needed.  
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8.4 Security and QoS Optimization 
8.4.1  Conclusion 
Due to the overheads caused by implementing security in ad hoc networks, 
security and QoS must be considered together. In this dissertation we have proposed a 
distributed, flexible mechanism to optimize security and QoS in mobile ad-hoc networks. 
The proposed architecture is based on three components: a policy based plug-in security 
framework, multi-layer QoS guided routing and a proportional integral derivative (PID) 
controller. The multi-layer QoS surface guided routing mechanism, which separates 
metrics at the different layers, provides an adaptable technique for obtaining desired QoS. 
The policy based security framework provides a dynamic and modular approach to 
providing security. The simulation results indicate th  proposed PID optimized security 
and QoS algorithm can produce similar performance as non-secure QoS routing protocol 
under various traffic loads. The level of security can be adaptable due to different traffic 
load. The best case scenario is under light traffic, where it can provide the same security 
level as any other secure protocols, but the same performance as non-secure QoS 
protocols. The worst case scenario is under extreme heavy traffic, it provides similar 
performance as QoS protocols, but with no security feature at all. Under medium and 
light traffic conditions, the proposed protocol can provide more secure networks without 
compromising the QoS performance.   
 
8.4.2  Future Work 
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This work can be easily extended to cater a network where security is of prime 
importance or where both QoS and security are important based on some weightage 
scheme. One issue that needs investigation is the memory and computational resources 
required at each node to implement the proposed scheme. 
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8.5 Security Measurement 
8.5.1  Conclusion 
The proposed measurement method not only identifies h  potential attack goals 
in the system, but also captures the attack sequence for an attack path and the relationship 
among different attack paths. This mechanism allows us to measure the relative security 
between two or more routing protocols, hence identifyi g the most secure protocol.   
Our state machine is a general model of network behavior and attack. Our security 
measurement method can be applied to any network. Our application of metric and 
method to AODV and DSDV give results that show the relative security of two protocols. 
 
8.5.2  Future Work 
Measuring security has been a long-standing challenge to the community. We 
suggest that the best way to begin is to start counting what is countable; then use the 
resulting numbers in qualitative manner. In other words – absolute metric, rather than 
relative is we have done. Perhaps over time our understanding will then lead to 
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802.11: A standard for wireless local area networks (WLAN) developed by 
a working group of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE). 
802.11a: An international IEEE standard for WLAN networks, operating at 
5 GHz and providing 54Mbps. Range up to 30m. 
802.11b: An international IEEE standard for WLAN networks, operating at 
2.4 GHz and providing 11 Mbps.  Range up to 100m. 
802.11g: An international IEEE standard for WLAN networks, operating at 
2.4 GHz and providing 54Mbps.  Range up to 100m. 
Access Point: A transceiver or radio component in a wireless LAN that acts as 
the transfer point between wired and wireless signal, and vice 
versa. The Access Point (AP) is connected to antennas as well as to 
the wired LAN system. 
Ad-Hoc Network: An Ad-Hoc wireless LAN is a group of computers each with 
wireless adapters, connected as an independent wireless LAN. 
Bridge:  A device which connects two or more networks. 
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Media Access Control Address (MAC Address): The uniq e physical address of each 
device's network interface card. 
Repeater: A device used in a network to strengthen a signal as it is passed 
along the network cable. 
Router: An active network component that connects one network to 
another network. Routers work with packets that include logical 
addressing information. 
Service Set Identifier (SSID):  Service set identifier. A unique identifier that 
stations must use to be able to communicate with an access point. 
The SSID can be any alphanumeric entry up to a maxium of 32 
characters. 
SSID Broadcasting: To “announce” the Access Points pre ence by broadcasting the 
SSID. 
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP): The protocols, or 
conventions, that computers use to communicate over the Internet. 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA): A system to secure Wi-Fi networks, intended to 
replace the current, less secure WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) 
system. Part of the IEEE 802.11i standard. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP): An encryption system that encrypts data on wireless 
networks that can only be read by authorized users with the correct 
decryption key. 
Wireless Fidelity (WI-FI): Another name for IEEE 802.11b. A wireless networking 
technology for PCs and PDAs that allows multiple devic s to share 
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a single high-speed Internet connection over a distance of about 
300 feet. 
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN): A wireless LAN is one in which a mobile 
user can connect to a local area network (LAN) through a wireless 
(radio) connection. 
Wireless Network: A network in which data is transmitted without wires, increasing 
mobility of the user and their access to data. 
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